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I Introduction
How does political change come about? While freedom of speech and assembly are central pil-
lars of democracy, recognized as intrinsically valuable, it is unclear how effective the exercise of
these freedoms is in bringing about change. Though there are numerous historical episodes where
political change has been associated with political demonstrations, such as the French Revolution,
the Civil Rights movement, and the recent Arab Spring, it is unclear to what extent these protests
caused change. Protests are likely to occur alongside other changes in society, and it is difficult
to disentangle whether they cause political change or simply reflect unobservable changes in pref-
erences and beliefs. Empirical evidence of the causal effects of protests is scarce. In fact, to our
knowledge, there is almost no empirical work quantifying the causal effects of protests on subse-
quent political outcomes. It is an open question to what extent political protests can cause political
change, and this paper sheds light on these issues.
More specifically, we investigate the impact of the Tea Party movement protests in the United
States on policymaking and citizen political behavior. The Tea Party movement is a conservative-
libertarian political movement in the United States that has organized protests and supported can-
didates for elected office since 2009. This setting is a well-suited testing ground for hypotheses
regarding the effectiveness of political protests and one of the few such settings for which exten-
sive data are available. The movement propagates an agenda that is systematically to the right
of the status quo, which makes the measurement of policy changes in the direction desired by the
movement straightforward. In addition, the largest protests in the early stage of the movement were
the nation-wide 2009 Tax Day Rallies. As this date was preset, it allows us to test whether the size
of local protests on Tax Day affected subsequent local political outcomes.
The main empirical challenge in estimating the impact of protests is that unobservable political
preferences are likely to determine both the number of protesters and policy outcomes. A naive
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regression of policy on protest size is therefore unlikely to reflect a causal effect. We address this
problem by exploiting variation in rainfall during the day of the protest. The idea is simple: people
are more prone to participate in protests if it does not rain. Conditional on the likelihood of rain,
rainfall is a random event, arguably uncorrelated with other factors that affect political outcomes.
Under the assumption that absence of rainfall affects policy and voting behavior only through the
number of protesters, this allows us to estimate the impact of protest size using an instrumental
variables approach. Even when relaxing this assumption, our estimates demonstrate the overall
importance of these initial events to the movement’s success.
We use data from a large number of sources to measure the influence of the Tax Day protests on the
Tea Party. The importance of the initial protests to local movement strength is evident in outcomes
as diverse as participation in Tea Party online social networks, political action committee contri-
butions, the number of protesters at subsequent protests, and survey measures of local political
beliefs. We show that these political protests and the movements they build affect policymaking
and voting behavior as well. Incumbent representatives vote more conservatively following large
protests in their district, and a rain-free rally in a district increases the likelihood that a Democratic
incumbent retires. Larger protests increase turnout in the 2010 elections, primarily favoring Re-
publican candidates. In particular, our baseline estimate shows that a 0.1 percentage-point increase
in the share of the population protesting corresponds to a 1.9 percentage-point increase in the share
of Republican votes. The Tea Party protests thus seem to have caused a shift to the right in terms
of policymaking, both directly and through the selection of politicians in elections.
In addition to providing exogenous variation in rally outcomes, variation in rainfall can be used to
assess the statistical significance of these results. We compare the effect of rainfall on the true date
of the rally to the distribution of placebo estimates of rainfall on other days. We find that none of the
placebo dates in 1980-2008 produce a cumulative effect as large as the effect estimated for Tax Day
2009. This finding, when combined with numerous additional robustness checks, demonstrates the
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reliability and significance of the results.
Our results relate to the large body of empirical and theoretical work that has attempted to explain
which factors drive political participation. Most empirical work on why people vote has identified
simple correlations between political activism and citizen characteristics (see e.g. Blaise 2000 for a
review). Papers that inform us about the the determinants of protest participation include Cicchetti
et al. (1971), Finkel and Opp (1991), and Finkel and Muller (1998), but there is little research
on the causal impact of political rallies. An exception is Collins and Margo’s (2004, 2007) work
on the effects of the riots following the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. on income, labor,
and housing market outcomes for African-Americans. Similar in spirit to this paper, they exploit
rain during the month of April 1968 as an instrument for riot severity. Madestam and Yanagizawa-
Drott’s (2011) use of daily rainfall to generate variation in outdoor participation on the Fourth of
July to study the impact of celebrating Independence Day is another example of such an approach.
Theoretical work has generally suggested that a sense of civic duty or consumption value drives po-
litical involvement (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Coate and Conlin 2004; Feddersen
and Sandroni 2006). Political theorists rationalizing why people protest offer explanations based
on the importance of peer pressure within smaller political groups (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Uh-
laner 1989; Oberschall 1994), on people’s (unrealistic) perception that that they can be politically
influential (Opp 1989), and on bandwagon effects (Kuran 1989). However, these results leave the
question of why protests would matter as instruments for political change unanswered.
One attempt to answer this question focuses on social dynamics within groups and networks of cit-
izens, and their influence on individuals’ desire to attain certain political goals (Zuckerman 2005).
Another influential strand of papers, written by Lohmann (1993, 1994a, 1994b), emphasizes the
role of information.1 Lohmann (1993, 1994a) models the role of visible political activism in reveal-
1See also Bueno de Mesquita (2010) for an information model where a revolutionary vanguard engages in public
violence to mobilize protesters.
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ing private information to the public at large and to policymakers, and in signaling the costs and
benefits of participating (1994b). We provide evidence suggesting that this mechanism is unlikely
to fully explain our results. First, it is unclear why weather-driven variation in protest size should
provide a signal about underlying beliefs or preferences, if weather on the protest day is orthogonal
to beliefs and preferences. Second, even if policy responds to protest size because it provides in-
formation about beliefs or preferences, differences across districts with and without rainfall on the
protest day should decrease as additional information arrives. We find no evidence of the effects
on incumbent behavior decreasing over time. Our results are therefore difficult to reconcile with
Lohmann’s framework.
Instead, since the effects are very much local, they suggest that personal interaction within small
groups of citizens serves as a crucial channel for the transmission of new political views and that
leads to increases in political activism, in line with Zuckerman’s (2005) ”social logic of politics”
and the shaping of a new social context that motivates citizens to “call folk, hustle, [and] out-
work [their] foe” (Texans for John Cornyn 2008). In our discussion we argue that Lohmann’s
information-driven model of the effectiveness of political activism cannot fully explain our results,
and that social networks, mobilization and/or habit formation are key missing elements that must
be incorporated into a full model of political protests. This argument is broadly consistent with the
qualitative evidence presented by Skocpol and Williamson (2011). In their study of the Tea Party
movement, based on interviews with activists and an analysis of their (on-line) activity, they em-
phasize the role rallies played in shaping the movement: “From interviews and tracking local Tea
Parties in public sources, we have learned that these groups were often launched by sets of orga-
nizers who did not know one another personally before they met in rallies or other protest settings”
(Skocpol and Williamson 2011: 93). These local groups then helped sustain the momentum of the
movement through regular meetings and grassroots organizing, often but not always facilitated by
individual members’ previous experience in other mediating institutions (Skocpol and Williamson
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2011: 37-44), which could be seen as analogous to the value of preexisting institutions to the Civil
Rights Movement in its heyday (McAdam 1985). We argue that it is through this mechanism,
and not solely through the revelation of privately held, pre-existing, policy views, that initial rally
turnout affected political and policy outcomes for the rest of the election cycle. Personal interaction
is, after all, a highly effective campaign instrument (Green and Gerber 2008).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II we provide background informa-
tion on the Tea Party movement. Section III contains a discussion of the data we use. In Section
IV we present the estimation framework and in Section V our empirical results. Section VI as-
sesses the robustness of the analysis. In Section VII we discuss and interpret our findings before
we conclude.
II The Tea Party Movement
II.A. Tea Party Goals and Organization
The 1773 Boston Tea Party has been a potent symbol for American anti-tax activists over the
past few decades, and its iconic value has regularly been exploited for protests and fund-raisers
(e.g. Holmes 1991, Levenson 2007). More recently, starting in early 2009, a broader political
movement has coalesced under the Tea Party banner (McGrath 2010). The movement’s support-
ers have come together in a loose coalition of national umbrella organizations that vary in their
degree of centralization and ideological focus. Though the movement is unified by opposition to
the Democrat-dominated federal government and mostly supports Republican candidates for of-
fice, it is not explicitly partisan. That said, there is broad consensus that the emanations of their
endorsements and exaltations constitute a penumbra desire to shift policy “to the right,” in an
across-the-board conservative direction (see e.g. Skocpol and Williamson 2011).
II.B. Tea Party Activism
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The outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis triggered a substantial policy response from both the
outgoing Bush administration and the incoming Obama administration. The Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, in particular,
involved extensive public resources in an effort to stabilize the U.S. economy, but also mobilized
resistance on the political right. When CNBC Business News editor Rick Santelli delivered a
televised and rapidly popularized attack on the U.S. government’s plans to refinance mortgages
and called for a “Chicago Tea Party,” he inspired several, relatively small, local protests in February
2009. As a broader protest movement started to take shape in the form of online and real-life “Tea
Party” groups, plans for larger coordinated protests culminated in the first large national showing
of activism on April 15, 2009 (Tax Day), when the groups held a large number of rallies across the
United States.
There were approximately 440,000-810,000 individuals protesting nation-wide on Tax Day 2009
(for data sources, see Section III). Figure I shows that more than 500 rallies took place across
the United States. These rallies can be seen as the true starting point of the national Tea Party
movement, as evidenced, for example, by the fact that it was the moment when most of the Tea
Party activists interviewed in Skocpol and Williamson (2011) “got involved for the first time”. Data
from Google Insights over the period 2007-2011 on the intensity of web searches of the term “Tea
Party” support this as well. These data are presented in Figure II, and show that such web searches
became much more common around the time of the rallies in April of 2009. In this paper, we study
the effect of these rallies on subsequent movement strength, on political beliefs in the population,
and on political outcomes, both in elections and in the legislature.
After the initial protests, much of the organizational effort of the different Tea Party groups shifted
focus away from public protests to fundraising and the construction of a more localized social-
movement infrastructure (Skocpol and Williamson, 2011), and to direct engagement with the insti-
tutionalized political process. In the remainder of our paper, we study the significance of the 2009
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Tax Day rallies to the effectiveness of these efforts in the year and a half that followed, up to the
2010 midterm elections. On the organizational side, we analyze the recruitment of volunteers by
local Tea Party groups in different locales, turnout at 2010 Tax Day rallies, the fundraising prowess
of Tea Party Express’ Political Action Committee, Our Party Deserves Better PAC, and changes in
local political preferences. On the more directly policy-focused side, we assess the consequences
the 2009 rallies had for local politicians’ decisions to retire, for election results, and for the votes
cast by incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
III Data and Summary Statistics
To construct our dataset we extract information from a number of sources in order to collect data
on rainfall, Tax Day rally attendance, Tea Party activism, media coverage, political beliefs, voting
outcomes, and policymaking. The following subsections present these sources and how they are
matched. Details on the data and how the variables are constructed can be found in the Data
Appendix in the On-Line Appendix.2
III.A. Rainfall Data
Information on precipitation comes from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
and contains data from approximately 12,000 weather stations over the period 1980-2010. We
construct our rainfall measure by aggregating the weather station data to the appropriate geographic
level (county or congressional district) and then extract the mean daily rainfall (in inches). In our
baseline measure, days with rainfall below 0.10 inches count as non-rainy; higher precipitation
levels are defined as rainy. Based on historical weather observations for the period 1980-2008, we
also create a measure of the probability that a county or congressional district experiences at least
0.10 inches of rain on a given day in April (see Section IV.A.).
III.B. Rally Attendance, Movement, and PAC Contributions Data
2All Appendix Tables and Figures can also be found in the On-Line Appendix.
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We collect attendance estimates for the Tax Day rallies held on April 15, 2009 from three different
sources: Tea Party self-reports (SurgeUSA.org 2009), the New York Times (Silver 2009), and the
Institute for Research and Education on Human Rights (IREHR 2010), a think tank in Kansas City.
Figure 1 depicts a map of the 542 rallies in our dataset. In the analysis, turnout is aggregated by
county. As the sources sometimes differ in the number of attendees reported, we use the mean
across all three as well as the maximum. While the mean is a reasonable approximation if the
measurement error is classical, our estimates could be biased if discrepancies in the reports lead to
non-classical measurement error.3 If less-attended rallies occur in counties with small populations,
and these events are more likely to be neglected, the measurement error would be correlated with
population size. Our data show that the likelihood that one source fails to report a rally in a county
when the other two do report declines in the county population. In addition, the within-county
cross-source variance in turnout is decreasing in population size.4 To alleviate the concern of
systematic misreporting, we present estimates using both mean and maximum attendance across
the three sources. We also report population-weighted per capita estimates to account for any
population-driven variance. Overall, approximately 440,000-810,000 individuals protested nation-
wide on Tax Day 2009.
To measure local Tea Party activism, we use data from IREHR on the number of social network
profiles posted on the websites of the five main Tea Party non-profit organizations and from Fed-
eral Election Commission campaign finance reports on donations to Tea Party Express. Our dataset
includes the total number of profiles of the following factions: Tea Party Patriots, Americans for
Prosperity and FreedomWorks, discussed above, as well as two smaller organizations, 1776 Tea
Party and ResistNet. These groups maintain their own social networking sites, with minimal pri-
vacy protections, allowing the IREHR to collect data on a daily basis since 2010. The “members”
3A simple OLS regression of election outcomes on rally size results in attenuation bias if there is classical mea-
surement error. In Table A.17, we show that the OLS estimates are indeed smaller in magnitude than the instrumental
variable estimates.
4See Figure A.1 for these discrepancies in reported rally size.
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included are typically the leadership of local chapters. Though Tea Party affiliation is largely unof-
ficial, these online profiles, much like donations to Tea Party Express, serve as reasonable proxies
for the number of activists involved in local Tea Party organizing. The total number of profiles
posted on these sites nationwide was approximately 150,000 in 2010. In addition to the member-
ship measures we also gauge local Tea Party activism by including attendance data for 2010 Tax
Day rallies from EconomyPolitics (2010).
Information on financial contributions in 2009 and 2010 to Our Country Deserves Better PAC, the
fund-raising wing of the Tea Party Express, was obtained from the Federal Election Commission
campaign finance reports. We aggregate individual-donation information to the county level. The
advantage of using this particular PAC is that it has no ties to a particular officeholder or region, and
that federal campaign finance legislation limits individual contributions to $5,000 per annum. It
therefore provides a reasonable measure of grassroots support of the national Tea Party movement.
III.C. Media Coverage
To measure local media coverage of the protests we use news articles from the NewsLibrary
database matched to Audit Bureau of Circulations county-level circulation data. Newslibrary.com
archives over 4,000 titles, but not those of large national newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal
or the New York Times. We collect information on all articles from newspapers with circulation
over 15,000 containing the phrase “Tea Party” from January 1, 2009 through June 20, 2010 and
merge these data to geographic regions using the county-level circulation information, ending up
with 255 publications across 46 states. To decide whether the area covered by a newspaper was
rainy or not on a given day, we use the circulation-weighted amount of precipitation. Over the full
time period these publications contain some 40,000 articles including the term “Tea Party.”
III.D. Political Beliefs
To study whether the rallies affected public support for the Tea Party movement as well as political
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beliefs more broadly, we use the Evaluations of Government and Society Study from the Ameri-
can National Election Studies (ANES). Interviews were conducted in October 2010, weeks before
the midterm election, and include a set of questions about the Tea Party and political opinions
associated with the movement’s leaders. The data also contain socio-demographic variables, vot-
ing behavior in the 2008 election, and each respondent’s reported likelihood of voting in the 2010
midterm election. We have information for a total of 42 states at the congressional-district level
that we match with rainfall, census, and survey data.5
III.E. Voting, Policy-making, and Demographic Data
Our political outcomes include election results in the 2010 midterm elections for the House of
Representatives, the decisions of incumbent congressmen to retire prior to the 2010 midterms,
and congressional voting behavior. To control for past electoral outcomes we use county and
congressional-district level data for the 2006 and 2008 House of Representatives elections and the
2008 presidential election. The election data come from David Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presiden-
tial Elections. Information on incumbent congressmen’s decisions whether or not to seek reelec-
tion was obtained from Wikipedia, while the ideological bent of congressional voting records is
measured using yearly roll-call ratings from the American Conservative Union. Finally, socio-
demographic county and district level data (income, population, race, immigrants, and unemploy-
ment) come from the 2000 and 2010 Census and the 2009 American Community Survey.
Table I presents summary statistics for our county level pre-rally variables.6 It shows that the coun-
ties that were plagued by rain are fairly similar in terms of past voting behavior, past donations
to Our Country Deserves Better PAC, population, racial composition of the population, and un-
employment compared to the rainless counties. The district level analogue, Table A.1, displays a
5The ANES lack county identifiers, barring an analysis at the county level.
6There are 2,758 counties in our sample. We lose some counties because of a combination of lack of data on
precipitation, demographics, and election outcomes.
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similar picture.7 Tables A.3a, A.3b, and A.3c contain descriptive statistics at the county, district,
and individual respondent level for the precipitation measures and our outcome variables.
IV Empirical Framework
The main challenge in measuring the effectiveness of political protests is that unobserved political
beliefs or a culture of activism are likely to be correlated with both the number of protesters and
other political behavior such as voting.
How then do we assess the impact of larger rally attendance? We investigate the Tea Party Tax
Day rallies held on April 15, 2009, but to estimate their effects we cannot simply assume that
the variation in turnout is orthogonal to future developments in the same local area. Instead we
rely on an approach that exploits the fact, established below, that people are less likely to attend
a rally if it rains. This allows us to estimate the causal impact of variation in rally attendance
if we are willing to assume that rainfall on the rally day only affects the outcomes of interest
through rally attendance. This exclusion restriction seems plausible, though a valid concern is that
bad weather may also make a rally less pleasant for actual attendees, energizing attendees and
the consequent movement less. We would then be measuring the effect of a combination of rally
size and rally impact per attendee as determined, among other things, by the likelihood of new
social ties forming. A similar concern is that weather directly, rather than through the number of
attendees, affects the likelihood that mass media cover the protests. If there is such a direct effect
and media coverage of political protests affects voting behavior and policy-making, the exclusion
restriction would again be violated. With these potential caveats in mind, we nevertheless believe
it is useful to scale the effects of weather by rally attendance in order to get a quantitative measure
of the importance of the Tea Party protests. We also present reduced-form effects of protest day
rainfall for all outcomes, where the exclusion restriction is not a necessary identifying assumption
7Table A.2 reports the county and district voting outcomes in levels. Again, there is no significant difference across
rainy and non-rainy counties or districts.
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for our interpretations. These results demonstrate the overall importance of the demonstrations for
future political outcomes.
IV.A. Specifications and Hypotheses
To estimate the effect of the protests, we first investigate whether rainfall decreases attendance
by regressing the number of protesters in a county on a dummy variable that indicates whether
there was significant rain in the county. We use the dummy specification primarily for ease of
interpretation. In Section VI we show that the results are robust to the way in which rainfall is
measured. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
Protestersc = Rainy Rallycθ
′ + Probability of Raincδ′ + µr + xcγ′ + εc, (1)
where Protesters is a measure of rally attendance in county c, Rainy Rally is a dummy equal
to one if there was more than 0.1 inch of rain in the county on the day of the rally (April 15,
2009) and Probability of Rain is a set of dummies controlling for the likelihood of rain on the
day of the protest. Furthermore, µ captures four U.S. Census region fixed effects, and x is a
vector of pre-determined county covariates. In order to exploit weather variation across counties
with similar baseline likelihoods of rainfall on the protest day, we control for the rain probability
flexibly. Specifically, we include dummy variables corresponding to the deciles in the historical
rain probability distribution. To derive this distribution, we take the fraction of historical days that
were rainy as defined by the 0.1 inch threshold.8 Since rainfall is likely to decrease attendance at
the rallies, we expect θ < 0.
Our baseline specification includes a set of pre-determined county controls. This inclusion is not
8As rain across adjacent days tends to be positively correlated, we restrict our data to April 1, 7, 15, 21, and 30 to
ensure that we use independent and identically distributed draws. In the end, this procedure yields 140 past realizations
for estimating the rainfall probability. The results are insensitive to dropping the rainfall dummies completely and to the
set of historical days we use. For example, the findings are robust to employing only April 15, or all days in April.
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necessary for our identification strategy if rainfall is uncorrelated with other determinants of politi-
cal outcomes, but will have the benefit of reducing residual variation and improving the precision of
our estimates.9 The standard set of covariates includes flexible controls for population size (decile
dummies) and other demographic controls: log of population density, log of median income, un-
employment rate, increase in unemployment between 2005 and 2009, share of whites, share of
African-Americans, share of Hispanics (the omitted category consists of other races and ethnici-
ties), and share of immigrants (in 2000). We also include election covariates: county vote share
for Barack Obama in the 2008 Presidential election and outcomes from the two preceding U.S.
House of Representatives elections (Republican Party vote share, number of votes for the Republi-
can Party in total or per capita, number of votes for the Democratic Party in total or per capita, and
turnout in total or per capita). Since the true functional form relating rainfall to attendance and later
political outcomes is unknown, we present regressions with outcomes both in per capita and levels
(the level results are relegated to the Appendix), where the per capita regressions are population-
weighted.10 For regressions in per capita terms (levels), we include election controls per capita
(levels) to match the outcome variables. The Data Appendix contains a detailed description of how
the variables are defined and constructed.
We cluster standard errors at the state level in all regressions. Clustering at the state level allows
9In Section VI we investigate the sensitivity of the estimates to the set of control variables and fixed effects. In
general, the results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar.
10Dickens (1990) demonstrates that population-weighting in geographically grouped data is only desirable when
group sizes are small enough that the variance of the average of individuals is larger than the variance of the group
component. For county-level observations group sizes are frequently quite small. More than 10% of the counties in our
data have fewer than 5,000 residents, meaning that the individual error component in per capita election and (especially)
Tea Party movement outcomes is large. While population-weighting can induce heteroskedasticity, a test recommended
by Dickens to gauge this effect (i.e. regressing the squared residuals from the WLS attendance regression on population
size) returns a small and statistically insignificant result. Additionally, measurement error is likely to be more problem-
atic in small counties. For example, the gap between the largest and smallest rally attendance estimate in per capita terms
declines with population size, and that relationship is statistically significant (see Figure A.1). Population weighting,
or, alternatively, a minimum population filter, is thus the correct approach and improves the precision of the per-capita
specifications. Nevertheless, to demonstrate the robustness of our results, we include unweighted specifications for key
outcomes in Table A.18. These tests also find that rain on April 15, 2009 negatively affected attendance and Tea Party
outcomes.
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for arbitrary within-state correlation and assumes that there is no cross-state correlation. If there
is substantial spatial correlation, this assumption may be too strong. To alleviate such concerns,
Figure III depicts the residual variation in rainfall that identifies the model. As can be seen in the
figure, there is variation within the various regions of the country. In Section VI we show that
inference is also robust to alternative methods.
In the second stage of our estimation, we examine whether the protests affected the strength of the
Tea Party movement and voting behavior, by using rainfall as a proxy for protest effectiveness:
yc = Rainy Rallycκ
′ + Probability of Raincδ′ + µr + xcγ′ + εc, (2)
where y is a variety of post-rally outcomes.
A limitation of these estimates is that it may be hard to interpret the size of κ, the coefficient on
our rainfall dummy. We therefore also produce estimates that provide a per-attendee scaling of the
weather effect on later outcomes:
yc = Protesterscλ
′ + Probability of Raincδ′ + µr + xcγ′ + εc, (3)
where y again represents a variety of post-rally outcomes. We estimate this equation using a
2SLS approach, with equation (1) being the first-stage regression. If rainfall affects outcomes
only through the size of the rally, we can give a strict causal interpretation to λ, which would
be a consistent instrumental-variable estimator of the causal effect of an additional protester on
outcomes. If protests have heterogeneous effects on outcomes, we will identify the local average
treatment effect (LATE) on counties where attendance is sensitive to whether it rains. For exam-
ple, if attendance by relative moderates is lower under worse weather conditions and has a larger
spillover effect on other individuals, the LATE is larger than the average effect.
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As described in the data section, we use mean rally attendance from three reporting sources for our
baseline estimates. To address the possibility of non-classical measurement error, we also show
estimates in the Appendix using the maximum reported attendance across the three sources. With
this framework in mind, our main hypothesis is that the protests strengthened the consequent Tea
Party movement and had a positive impact on votes for the Republican Party, λ > 0.
A natural channel through which rallies may have long-run effects is through increased local media
coverage. Media coverage of a political movement can serve as a device for spreading informa-
tion about a movement’s policy agenda, which in turn may energize and grow the movement, or
persuade voters and policy-makers. To test this mechanism, we estimate the effects of weather on
the protest day on local newspapers’ coverage of the Tea Party movement. We run cross-sectional
regressions week-by-week at the paper level, where the dependent variable is a count of the number
of articles containing the phrase “Tea Party” and the independent variable is the measure of rain
on Tax Day 2009 described in section III. By estimating week-by-week effects using an equation
analogous to equation (2), we can test whether rainfall affects media coverage immediately after
the rallies, as well as whether there is an effect on later events that were important to the Tea Party
movement.11
To assess whether the protests increase support for the movement and its political views, we use
ANES survey data on political beliefs. District identifiers for survey participants are matched
with district rainfall, which enables us to estimate a specification that is essentially identical to
equation (2), using respondent outcomes, covariates, district rain probability and population size
decile dummies, log population density, and region fixed effects:
yi = Rainy Rallyiβ
′ + Probability of Rainiδ′ + xiγ′ + xdθ′ + ε i, (4)
11As we do not have election and demographic data at the newspaper level, the media regressions are estimated
without these covariates. Since the unit of observation is not a county, we also do not scale the effects by rally size.
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The covariates on socio-demographics are age, education, race, income, unemployment status,
rural, and foreign-born status. Pre-determined election covariates, from 2008, are dummies in-
dicating whether the respondent voted for the Republican Party in the election for the House of
Representatives.12
Finally, political protests may also affect policy. To investigate whether the Tea Party protests
were successful in getting their policies implemented, we estimate the reduced-form relationship
between rain during the protests and later policy-making outcomes in congressional districts. These
outcome variables are the American Conservative Union’s (ACU) assessment of congressmen’s
voting behavior, and a dummy variable indicating whether the incumbent congressman decided to
retire prior to the 2010 midterm election. The ACU scores measure the percentage of scored votes
that accord with the ACU position and are scaled from 0 (most liberal) to 100 (most conservative).
As the ACU scores are available for every year, we estimate separate cross-sectional regressions
for 2009 and 2010 along the lines of equation (2):
yd = Rainy Rallydβ
′ + Probability of Raindδ′ + µr + xdγ′ + εd, (5)
where we include the same set of demographic and election controls employed in the county-
level regressions. In addition, we also account for the past two years of ACU scores (decile dum-
mies) and the identity of the victorious party in the last two elections (dummy variables identifying
whether the past two elections were won by the Democrats, Republicans or a combination of the
two).13 We use equation (5) to test the hypothesis that the Tea Party protests affected policymaking
in a conservative direction through either incumbents’ voting behavior or by differentially affecting
Republican and Democratic incumbents’ likelihood of retirement. Our hypothesized underlying
12Since we do not have rally attendance numbers at the district level, we cannot scale the weather effect by attendees.
13As the ACU score distribution is bi-modal with Democrats and Republicans clustered around different means, a
change from one party to the other can have a large impact making our estimates imprecise. We increase precision by
including controls for such shifts in the past to capture prior differences across districts that account for the switching.
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mechanism for this effect is that a lack of rain increases protest attendance (equation 1), which
strengthens the Tea Party movement and shifts the electorate towards more conservative policies
(equations 2-4), which policy-makers ultimately respond to for re-election purposes (equation 5,
β < 0).
IV.B. Exogeneity Check
A key identifying assumption is that rainfall in equation (1) is uncorrelated with other determinants
of political outcomes. As shown in Tables I, A.1, and A.2 rainy and non-rainy counties and districts
are quite similar on average. To more carefully address potential concerns regarding our identifying
assumption in equations (1)-(5), we present exogeneity checks at both the county and the district
level. Table II shows estimates produced by regressing pre-rally values of outcome variables on a
dummy variable representing whether it rained on Tax Day 2009. The dependent variables used
include the results of the 2008 House and presidential elections. The regressors are identical to
those in equation (1), with the exception that the 2008 political covariates constitute the outcome
variables and 2006 election controls are included to account for previous political trends. Table II
shows that the rainfall dummy in our specification is not significantly correlated with any of the
pre-rally political outcomes. (Table A.4 reports the results for voting outcomes in levels and the
pre-rally donations to Our Country Deserves Better PAC.)
Table A.5 presents district level estimates for the regression equivalent of equation (5) for the
ACU’s roll-call scores in years before the rally, where covariates analogous to those in equation
(5) are included for roll-call scores and election outcomes in preceding years. The rain dummies
do not contribute significantly to explaining the variation in roll-call scores in any of these cases.
Together, Tables II, A.4, and A.5 lend credibility to our identification strategy.
V Results
V.A. The Effect of Rainfall on Rally Attendance
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Table III presents estimations of equation (1). It shows that rainfall decreases attendance at the
Tea Party Tax Day rallies. Columns (1)-(4) estimate the effects in per capita, where the dependent
variable is scaled by the percent of the population attending. The estimate in column (1) uses
the mean attendance across reporting sources, and implies that rainfall decreases the share of the
county population protesting by 0.082 percentage points (t = 3.98). Given a (population-weighted)
sample mean of 0.16 percent of the county population attending, rainfall decreases rally size by
approximately 51%. To address the possibility of measurement error and under-reporting (see
section III.B.), column (2) estimates the effect using the highest reported attendance across the
three sources. The estimate indicates that bad weather decreased attendance by 0.17 percentage
points (t = 3.69), or, analogously, a 58% reduction in rally size. Column (3) shows a significant
relationship when we instead use the precipitation amount (hundreds of inches), and column (4)
shows that rainfall decreases attendance when the equation is estimated on the sample of 542
counties for which there was a reported rally.14 Columns (5)-(8) present results for analogous
specifications where the dependent variable is measured in thousands of protesters, and show a
similar pattern of highly significant coefficients. The estimates in column (5) imply that rainfall
decreases attendance by 96 protesters (t = 4.25) on average, and the upper bound estimate using
the highest reported number of attendees in column (6) implies a deterrent effect of bad weather
of 190 fewer protesters (t = 3.71). 15 Finally, when the dependent variable is scaled in logs, we
find that rainfall decreases rally size by approximately 50% (0.473 log points, column (9)), which
is consistent with the previous results.16 In the remainder of the paper, we focus on per capita
14Conditioning the sample will introduce a bias if rainfall decreases the likelihood that there is a rally, so this estimate
should be interpreted with caution. In fact, precipitation is negatively correlated with the likelihood of having a reported
rally (results not shown for brevity).
15In Table A.16, we investigate whether the “complier” counties, i.e. counties where the protest size responds to
rainfall, are counties of a particular political leaning. We do so by dividing counties into categories reflecting whether
they are Republican leaning, Democratic leaning, or swing counties in the 2010 midterm election, based on the predicted
Republican vote share from previous elections and socio-demographics. We show that weather has an effect on protest
size in all three types of counties.
16Since the natural logarithm is undefined at zero, this regression is estimated on the sample of reported rallies. Also,
to be consistent across specifications, the election covariates are measured in logs, which reduces the sample further
19
and mean specifications (the equivalent level and maximum attendance results can be found in the
Appendix).
V.B. Movement Outcomes
One of the primary mechanisms through which protests are thought to influence policy is by
strengthening associated political movements. Historically, it has been difficult to obtain data on
this type of activity, but the Tea Party’s on-line-era birth allows us to measure local activism along
some dimensions. For example, though Tea Party affiliation is largely informal, the number of
social network profiles posted on the websites of the five main Tea Party factions is a good proxy
for the number of activists involved in local Tea Party organizing. As discussed in the data sec-
tion, the IREHR has provided us with geocoded tallies as of July 1, 2010. In addition, we use
information on numbers of donors to Tea Party Express. The first two columns of Table IV show
that lack of rain during the 2009 Tax Day rallies causes more local organizers; column (1) implies
that non-rainy counties have a 0.0077 percentage points higher share of the population engaged as
local Tea Party organizers, on average, compared to rainy counties (significant at the 5% level),
or approximately an increase of 13% from a (weighted) sample mean of 0.058. When making the
additional assumption that the effects are driven purely by larger rally attendance, the estimates of
equation (3) imply that a one percentage point increase in the number of protesters causes a 0.093
percentage point increase in the share of the local population joining the Tea Party movement as
organizers (column (2)).17 While the absolute magnitudes are modest, relative to overall activity
measured by these social networking sites the effect of Tax Day rain is substantial. The overall
impact of Tax Day rain on participation may be considerably larger if unmeasured involvement is
similarly affected.
by excluding observations where there were zero votes for a party in the preceding elections (i.e. where races were
uncontested).
17In Appendix Table A.6 we show that the level outcomes and the specifications using the maximum number of
attendees yield similar results.
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We provide further evidence that protests can have a persistent effect on future activism by estimat-
ing whether they increase Tax Day rally participation the following year (i.e., on April 15, 2010).
Columns (3) and (4) of Table IV show that a lack of rain during the 2009 rallies indeed leads to
higher attendance during the 2010 rallies; a rain-free rally in 2009 causes a 0.065 percentage point
higher share of the population to show up (significant at the 5% level). This is a non-trivial effect,
since the average share of the population attending in 2010 is 0.070, which implies that lack of
rain in 2009 approximately doubles the size of the protests locally the following year.18 Scaled by
attendees, the estimate in column (4) indicates that a one-percentage point increase in the number
of protesters in 2009 causes a 0.79 percentage point increase in the share of the county population
protesting in 2010. Thus, Table IV lends credence to the idea that protests can facilitate the building
of a movement, and that protests beget protests.
V.C. Monetary Contributions
The strength of a political movement can partly be assessed by the willingness of its supporters
to contribute in monetary terms. Table IV, columns (5) through (8) above, presents the effect of
rain on the day of the rally on contributions to Our Country Deserves Better PAC. The reduced-
form regressions in columns (5) and (6) demonstrate that lack of rain on the date of the rally
significantly reduces contributions from individuals residing in the county. The estimate on the
rain dummy in column (5) is for 2009 post-rally contributions, and imply that good weather caused
approximately a $0.00032 per-capita increase (significant at the 5% level). Column (6) provides
further evidence that the protests had a persistent and strong effect on support for the movement,
as rain-free rallies lead to a $0.0011 per capita increase in 2010 contributions.19 Given the sample
means, this corresponds to a 16% increase in 2009 contributions and a 14% increase in 2010.
18This effect is quite large, but partly comes from the fact that attendance in 2010 was lower across the board than
in 2009. One explanation for this decline in rally attendance is provided by Skocpol and Williamson (2011: 85):
“Following the big DC rally in September 2009, more of the same seemed “anticlimactic,” explains Lynchburg Tea
Partier John Patterson.
19The 2010 data contain contributions up to the November elections.
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Column (7) shows the effect on the sum across the two years. The scaled result in the final column
indicates that a one percentage point increase in the population protesting leads to a $1.7 increase
in per capita contributions. This increase in monetary contributions may seem small in absolute
terms, but the data we use are for only one specific PAC. If contributions to other affiliated groups
are similarly affected, the total monetary impact could be substantial. Together with the effects
presented in columns (1) through (4), our results show that political rallies can trigger both growth
of and support for a movement as individuals volunteer as organizers and contribute monetarily,
and that such effects can last for extended periods of time.
V.D. Media Coverage
An additional mechanism through which protests can create support for a movement and further
its policy agenda is media coverage. That is, if mass media report on the protests and the policies
promoted by the protesters, the movement may itself be energized, or get the attention of the general
population and, ultimately, policy-makers, who are known to respond strongly to news coverage
(Eisensee and Stro¨mberg, 2007). Figure IV plots the time series of the estimated coefficient and
confidence intervals. As expected, rain on April 15, 2009 has no significant effect on the level of
media coverage prior to the Tax Day rallies, which are marked in red. On Tax Day itself, a rainy
rally leads to a statistically significant decrease of one article per week and newspaper or about 20-
25% of the mean level of coverage. We interpret this effect as media finding it worthwhile to cover
and report on a protest if it is sufficiently large, rather than small and insignificant (or, of course,
non-existent). The remainder of the figure tracks the effect of rain on April 15, 2009 on coverage in
subsequent weeks. For most of the sample, the measured effect is slightly negative (though close
to zero) and statistically insignificant. This coefficient becomes significant for only four events.
Interestingly, all four statistically significant dates correspond to important events for the Tea Party
movement. A drop in coverage of a size similar to the 2009 Tax Day drop occurs on Tax Day 2010,
when attendance, as we saw in Section V.B., was driven down by rainfall on Tax Day 2009. This is
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consistent with the idea that media report on political activism once it is sufficiently substantial in
magnitude. Smaller but still statistically significant differentials were also found around July 4th,
when there were many local events (Freedomworks 2009), and around the 2009 off-cycle elections.
This means that even though there is no clear constant increase in media coverage of the movement
in rain-free areas, we cannot exclude that some of the effects we find are reinforced by spikes in
media coverage around key protest dates.
V.E. Political Beliefs
As mentioned in Section II, Tea Party protesters commonly display discontent with the state of
affairs in the country, and the movement, broadly speaking promotes a conservative-libertarian
political agenda. Table V presents survey evidence, from about two weeks before Election Day
2010, showing that the protests increase popular support for the movement, and that the local
population in areas with large rallies adopts political opinions typically expressed by the protesters
and the Tea Party’s leaders.20
Respondents in non-rainy districts are approximately 6 percentage points more likely to express
strong support for the Tea Party movement (column (1)). From a sample mean of 12.0%, this cor-
responds to approximately a 45% increase in the number of Tea Party supporters a year and a half
later. Good weather also produces more favorable views towards former Alaska Governor Sarah
Palin (column (2)), who was one of the movement’s most outspoken leaders in 2010.21 According
to the estimates, the discontent expressed by the protesters spill over to the local population, as 26%
more individuals in non-rainy districts report feelings of outrage about the way things are going
in the country (column (3) shows a 4.6 percentage point increase). There is also evidence that the
20All regressions include demographic controls. The results are robust to the exclusion of the controls, with similar
point estimates, and significance at least at the same levels (results not shown for brevity). As attendance data is not
available at the district level, we do not scale these estimates.
21For example, she participated as a speaker in the rallies organized throughout the country as a part of the Tea Party
Express Bus Tours of 2009 and 2010. She was, of course, also the Republican Vice-Presidential candidate in 2008.
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protesters’ and movement’s small-government, largely libertarian and anti-Obama views spill over
to the population: respondents are 5.8 percentage points more likely to oppose raising taxes on
incomes above $250,000 (column (4)), 6.5 percentage points more likely to believe that Americans
have less freedom compared to 2008 (column (5)), and 4.6 percentage points more likely to have
unfavorable feelings towards President Obama (column (6)). Following Kling et al. (2004, 2007)
we also derive the average effect across all outcomes.22 Column (7) presents the average belief ef-
fect of rally rainfall on the family of political beliefs and shows that rain reduces preferences in line
with the Tea Party’s agenda by 0.13 standard deviations on average (significant at the 1% level).
Finally, column (8) provides evidence suggesting that the protests (and consequent growth of the
Tea Party movement) not only move beliefs in a conservative direction, but also facilitate voter
mobilization. When asked to assess the likelihood that the respondent will vote in the midterm
elections, individuals living in non-rainy districts report a 6.7 percentage point higher likelihood of
turning out.
V.F. Election Outcomes
Did these individuals actually turn out to vote in the 2010 elections to the House of Represen-
tatives? Table VI provides evidence that rallies lead to more votes for Republicans and a larger
Republican vote share. Column (1) presents the reduced-form effect, which show that counties
that lack rain during the protests see a 1.04 percentage points larger share of the population voting
for the Republican Party on average. Given a mean of 14.97 this yields an overall impact of 7
percent. Scaling the effect by the number of protesters, column (2) suggests that a 0.1 percentage
point increase in the share of the population protesting increases the share of the population voting
for the Republican Party by 1.2 percentage points (significant at the 1% level). Columns (3) and
(4) show that there is little evidence that the protests impact votes for the Democratic Party, which
suggests that the Tea Party protests, together with the consequent increase in media coverage and
22See Section VI for an extensive discussion of how we construct the average-effect measure for our study.
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the strength of the movement, raise turnout in favor of the Republican Party. Since the (population-
adjusted) marginal protester brings an additional 12 votes to the Republican camp, these estimates
provide additional evidence indicating that political protests have large spillover effects on non-
protesters. The 95%-confidence interval rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to
1, i.e. that there are no spillover effects. We provide a discussion below as to how such spillover
effects may arise.
This number of additional Republican votes generated may seem large at first glance, but it is
important to realize that extra protesters lead to larger membership, higher contributions, and more
conservative beliefs locally, thereby creating momentum reminiscent of the momentum caused by
the early voters in Knight and Schiff (2010), who find that early voters in Democratic primaries
have “up to 20 times the influence of late voters in the selection of candidates.”
Columns (5) and (6) estimate the electoral advantage for the Republican Party, where the outcome
variable is Republican vote share. The effects are non-trivial, implying that lack of rain increases
the Republican vote share by 1.55 percentage points (significant at the 5% level), and that a 0.1
percentage point increase in the share of the population protesting leads to a 1.9 percentage-point
increase in the Republican vote share.23 Column (7) shows the implications at the congressional-
district level: good rally weather raises the Republican vote share by almost 2%. In other words,
our results show that the Tea Party protests were highly effective in getting out the vote and bringing
electoral success to Republicans in the 2010 House of Representatives election.
23In Table A.17, we compare the scaling estimates to the OLS estimates. In general, the OLS estimates are smaller in
magnitude. This may be due to several reasons. First, as described in the data section and depicted in Figure A1, there is
non-trivial measurement error in the reported rally size. This can lead to attenuation bias that the scaling estimates are not
subject to. Also, as the measurement error is likely to be non-classical and driven by under-reporting for small counties,
population weighting partly addresses this. Unweighted regressions result in even larger 2SLS estimates, shown in
Table A.18, since more weight is put on smaller counties with under-reported rally size. Second, under the exclusion
restriction and heterogeneous effects, the scaling estimate captures the local average treatment effect. This may be larger
than the average effect of protest size. One reason for this may be that weather affects attendance in counties with many
potential swing voters (see Table A.16). Finally, as mentioned in section IV, rainfall may affect voting behavior not only
through protest size, but also by directly increasing media coverage of the protests, which in turn has an effect on voting
behavior.
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Assessing the nation-wide impact of the Tea Party protests based on our estimates is a difficult
task. First, there could be spillover effects that we are not able to capture within our cross-sectional
framework. Also, the scaled estimates using rainfall as an instrument will capture the LATE, which
may differ from the average effect of protesters, or the effect under identical weather conditions.
Finally, if the functional form is misspecified or the exclusion restriction of equation (2) is vio-
lated, the estimates would misrepresent the true average causal effect. With these caveats in mind,
we do a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation assessing the nation-wide impact of the Tea Party
protests, using the most conservative estimates of equation (2). According to our data across all 542
reported rallies, there were an approximate 440,000-810,000 individuals protesting nation-wide on
Tax Day 2009. Using our most conservative per-protester estimate, the protests mobilize an esti-
mated 20,000-40,000 additional local Tea Party organizers, 169,000-349,000 additional protesters
during the 2010 Tax Day rallies, and an increase in donations to the Tea Party Express’ PAC of
$362,000-$748,000. Furthermore, the protests have an estimated nation-wide effect on the 2010
midterm election corresponding to 2.7-5.5 million additional votes for the Republican Party in the
2010 House elections.24 Our results thus provide support for the commonly held notion that the
Tea Party Movement played an important role in the Republican Party’s landslide win in the 2010
House elections. Our results also indicate that the initial nation-wide Tea Party protests on Tax
Day in 2009 were key in building the Tea Party movement and driving the conservative shift in the
electorate.
V.G. Policy Outcomes
Ultimately people care about political rallies and movements because they have the potential to
24The calculations are based on multiplying the total number of protesters with the per-protester scaled estimates
(where the lower-bound is derived from the specification using the maximum number of attendees showed in the Ap-
pendix). They are taken from columns (2) of Table A.6 and (2) of Table IV, columns (6) of Table A.6 and (4) of Table
IV, columns (4) of Table A.7 and (8) of Table IV, and columns (2) of Table A.8 and (2) of Table VI, respectively. These
are, of course, point estimates, and as such one should take into account that there is uncertainty about the true value
of the coefficient. For a highly conservative measure, one can take the lower bound of the 95%-confidence interval, in
which case the estimated nation-wide effects are much smaller.
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change policy. One channel is through elections. Another is through policy-making by incumbents.
Though the Tea Party umbrella encompasses many policy positions, in practice the vast majority of
these positions are to the right of the median voter. We therefore test whether exogenous changes
in the size of Tea Party rallies across districts impacted the voting record of representatives as
evaluated by a group with similar political preferences, the American Conservative Union. Each
year the ACU assigns each congressman a score based on his votes on a select number of House
bills. This score, which ranges from 0 to 100, measures the extent to which the votes accord
with the preferences of the ACU. In Table VII, we explore the effect of protest attendance on this
measure of voting behavior.
Columns (1) through (4) indicate that rain on the date of the rally has significant effects on voting
records in 2009 and 2010, in spite of the fact that Representatives from rainy and non-rainy rally
districts had similar voting records through 2008. The estimates indicate that scores in districts with
smaller rallies due to rain were less conservative by 1.9 to 2.8 ACU points in 2009 (significant at
the 5% and 1% percent level, respectively), when the sample mean equaled 41.25 For comparison,
the difference between the average Democrat and the average Republican is about 85, while the
standard deviation within the Republican caucus is about 12.5.26 The effect in 2010 is estimated
at 3.2-4.3 points (significant at the 1% and 5% percent level), with slightly lower point estimates
when taking the difference between 2010 and 2008 scores. As the ACU score is based on 24 roll
call votes on which the ACU has an explicit position, with one vote for the conservative position
giving a score of 100/24, the effect of non-rainy rallies corresponds to approximately 1 additional
conservative vote in 2010. The fact that the estimates in 2010 are slightly larger suggests, much
like the election results discussed before, that the policy impact of the initial rallies does not fade
over time. It is also important to note that these changes are driven by incumbent House members.
25In column (1) we estimate the effect on the full sample of all congressmen. However, since a substantial fraction of
representatives did not vote on all the bills scored by the ACU, we provide estimates on the sample of representatives
that actually voted on all 25 scored bills in 2009 (24 in 2010). The sample size is therefore smaller.
26The equivalent within-party deviation for the Democrats is about 6.
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These results therefore demonstrate that the politicians in office respond to rallies and the perceived
beliefs of their constituents. Of course, not every change in voting behavior has direct legislative
effects, as many pieces of legislation would have passed or not regardless. Still, the significant
impact of Tax Day rain suggests that these results may indicate substantive shifts in voting records
rather than just symbolic changes. Also, columns (7) and (8) show that there is an additional
selection effect through the re-election behavior of incumbents: no rain on the day of the rally is
estimated to make it about 9.4 percentage points likelier for Democrat incumbents to retire, while
there is no such effect for Republican incumbents. This suggests that the Tea Party protests were
effective in shifting the electorate towards more conservative policies (as shown in Tables VI and
VII), forcing some Democratic incumbents into retirement.
To summarize, we find that the weather-driven exogenous variation in rally attendance on Tax
Day 2009 affects the eventual impact of these rallies. Where it did not rain the number of local
Tea Party activists was larger than where it did. Grassroots organizing increased, as did contri-
butions to associated PACs and attendance at subsequent rallies. The population at large adopted
the conservative-libertarian views of the protesters, and voters mobilized. This then led to more
conservative voting both in the 2010 midterm elections and in the U.S. House of Representatives,
and encouraged Democrat incumbents to retire.
VI Robustness
To assess the sensitivity of the results to our baseline econometric specifications we perform a set
of robustness tests. The outcomes of these tests are presented in a series of tables in the Appendix.
VI.A. Specification
First, in Tables A.9a and A.9b we show that the main results are robust to how the covariates are
specified. Specifically, we run regressions excluding the demographic covariates (panel A) or the
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region fixed effects (panel B), as well as a specification with flexible covariates (panel C).27 The
estimated coefficients in these regressions are of the same sign, similar in magnitude and significant
at the 5% level for all outcomes. It should be noted that the point estimates are generally less
precisely estimated when covariates are excluded (e.g., see Table VI, columns (5) and (7), for
comparisons with our baseline specification). When covariates are excluded for the Republican
vote share outcome, the point estimate is significant at the 10% level or insignificant at the county
level, while it remains significant at the 5% level at the congressional-district level (panel A and
B, columns (13) and (14)). The district-specific results in Table A.9b are quite similar to the main
results in terms of significance and magnitude for ACU scores, incumbents’ decision to retire, as
well as average political belief effect. Table A.10 presents reduced-form estimates for the main
outcomes using the 9 Census division fixed effects. Column (2) shows that the coefficients are
more noisily estimated, which is unsurprising given there is less variation in rainfall. Columns (3)
and (4) account for the fact that some divisions only had a few counties and districts with rainfall by
restricting the sample to divisions with meaningful within-division variation in rainy protests. The
estimates are robust to these sample permutations, though the significance level occasionally drops
below conventional cutoffs for future protests and PAC contributions. In sum, our findings are quite
insensitive to the set of covariates or regional controls included in our baseline specification.
Second, we present results using different measures of rain on the day of the protest in Tables A.11a
and A.11b. In particular, we use a higher precipitation threshold for the rainfall dummy (panel
A), the natural logarithm of the precipitation amount (panel B), or a rainfall dummy that uses all
weather stations within 10 miles of the county centroid as opposed to the stations within a county’s
borders (panel C). In Panel A, the coefficients are estimated using a precipitation threshold for
significant rain defined at 0.35 inches, instead of the baseline specification of 0.1 inches. Essentially
all the coefficients in both the county and district-level regressions are equal to or larger than those
27In the flexible controls specification, we include nine dummies for each variable, where each dummy corresponds
to a decile in that variable’s distribution (one decile is the omitted category).
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flowing from the baseline specification, and significant at the 5% or 10% level.28 The estimates in
Panel B show that the results are qualitatively similar when using a continuous measure of rainfall.
Finally, restricting rainfall to a circle with a ten-mile radius around the county or district centroid
(Panel C) changes little for our county results whereas some of our findings on the district level are
more sensitive to this rainfall definition.29 For example, the 2009 ACU score and the average effect
on political beliefs are no longer significant and smaller in magnitude. Taken together, however,
the tests indicate that the results are reasonably robust to the construction of the rainfall variable on
the day of the protest.
Third, in Table A.12 we estimate the coefficients using a nonparametric estimation method, by
checking the sensitivity of our results using the nearest-neighbor matching estimator (Abadie et al.
2004). Each county with rainfall is matched to the four non-rainy counties with the closest values
of the controls using a procedure that is bias-corrected and includes robust standard errors. The
match is based on the discrete distribution of the controls employed in our baseline specification
(identical to Table A.9a, panel C). The estimates are significant at the 5% level and similar or larger
in magnitude compared to the OLS estimates.
Fourth, in Tables A.13 and A.14 we restrict the sample in two ways. Table A.13 shows the results
when we exclude counties with a population size below 10,000 or above 1,000,000 people. Our
findings hold up well in this setting, suggesting that outliers in terms of population size are unlikely
to drive the results. Table A.14 limits the data to those counties where at least one of the three
sources reports that a rally was held on Tax Day in 2009. Restricting the sample in this way
will lead to unbiased estimates under the assumption that rainfall does not affect the likelihood of
holding a rally, or being of significant enough size for the rally to be reported. This assumption
may not be realistic, however, as behavioral mechanisms or preferences that drive lower attendance
28The share of counties with a rainfall dummy equal to one decreases from 0.2 to 0.08 when we use the higher
precipitation threshold. As there is less variation in the rainfall variable, the standard errors become larger.
29Since there are counties without rainfall stations within ten miles of the county radius, the sample size is smaller.
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on the intensive margin are likely to affect the extensive margin as well.30 Nevertheless, the results
are qualitatively similar when the sample is conditioned in this way.
VI.B. Inference
The baseline specification clusters the standard errors at the state level, which requires an assump-
tion of zero cross-state spatial correlation. Since this assumption may be rather strong, we conduct
three robustness tests to assess the sensitivity of the results to spatial correlation.
First, we calculate standard errors that account for spatial dependence parametrically, following
the procedure developed by Conley (1999). This procedure allows for spatial dependence in each
spatial dimension (latitude and longitude) that declines in distance between units (county or district
centroids, in our case) and equals zero beyond a maximum distance. Since this maximum distance
is unknown, we provide standard errors with four different maximum distances: 5, 10, 15 and 20
degrees, respectively.31 Table A.15 presents the results together with the state-clustered standard
errors for the main outcomes.32 In general, the results are still significant when using these alter-
native ways of calculating the standard errors, and the magnitude of the spatial standard errors is
broadly comparable to that of the state-clustered ones.
Second, to assess whether our effects are driven by an influential county or area, we run regressions
where we drop each state. Figure A2 plots the distribution of coefficients, and shows that the results
are not driven by a particular state.33
Third, and perhaps most importantly, we conduct a series of placebo tests using rainfall on other
30In fact, depending on the specification, we can reject the null hypothesis that rainfall does not affect the likelihood
of having a reported rally.
31A degree is approximately 68.3 miles (110 kilometers), depending on where on earth it is measured. Five degrees
is about the shortest east-west distance of Utah’s state boundaries.
32The procedure developed by Conley does not allow for population-weighted regressions. However, if the un-
weighted standard errors here are comparable in magnitude to the unweighted state-clustered standard errors, there
is no obvious reason why one would suspect population-weighted standard errors not to be comparable.
33Region-by-region and state-by-state Fama-MacBeth regressions show similar results.
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historical dates in April. These placebos are drawn from the same spatially correlated distribution
as rainfall on April 15, 2009. If rainfall on the protest day has a causal effect, the actual estimate
of rainfall ought to be an outlier in the distribution of placebo coefficients. To implement this
procedure, we rerun each regression (for the main outcomes) replacing the rainfall dummy on the
protest day (April 15, 2009) with the rainfall dummy from a historical day in April between 1980
and 2008. Since there are days when there are no (or very few) counties in the entire country
that experienced significant rain, we run the placebo regression only on the dates where at least
ten percent of the counties experienced significant rain.34 There are 627 placebo dates in the
sample at the county level. Figure V presents the cumulative distributions of placebo coefficients
for the main outcomes, together with the actual estimate from the 2009 protest day (the black
line). (The remaining placebo graphs can be found in Appendix Figure A3.) It also reports the
fraction of placebo estimates that are larger in magnitude than the actual estimate (in absolute
terms, or in terms of a larger negative value). It shows that the actual estimate is indeed an outlier
in the distribution of placebo dates in essentially all regressions. For example, only 0.4% of the
placebo estimates of the effect of rainfall on Tea Party protesters in 2009 are more negative than
the actual estimate, and 1.0% of the estimates are larger in absolute magnitude. For local Tea Party
organizers, 1.5% of the estimates are more negative, and 4.8% are larger in absolute magnitude.
Similarly, only 3.7% of the placebo estimates of the effect of rainfall on Republican votes are more
negative than the actual estimate, and 9.1% of the estimates are larger in absolute magnitude. These
tests strengthen the claim that the rainfall truly caused a stronger Tea Party movement, as well as
more conservative policy-making and voting behavior in the general population.
Finally, our findings do not rest on any individual result alone, but on the fact that so many different
34By requiring that there is at least some non-trivial amount of variation in rainfall across counties, we help avoid that
each placebo estimate is driven by a few outlier counties. As the mean share of counties with significant rainfall across
dates in the placebo sample is 0.20, and the actual share of counties with significant rainfall on the April 15 2009 protest
day is 0.22, the actual rainfall realization can be viewed as a typical draw from the placebo date distribution (standard
deviation is 0.11).
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measures of Tea Party strength and impact are affected in the hypothesized direction. To evaluate
the likelihood of finding so many consistent results, we follow the method used in Kling et al.
(2004, 2007) and Clingingsmith et al. (2009) and construct an average-effect measure. Specifically,
we define the average-effect size for K outcomes as:
τ =
1
K
K
∑
k=1
pik
σk
(6)
where pik is equal to the effect of rainfall on outcome k, and σk is the standard deviation of outcome
k in the comparison non-rainfall group. We construct this measure using all outcome variables
(contributions, percentage of votes, vote share, political beliefs, organizers, ACU scores, and sub-
sequent rally attendance in both level and per capita terms, where relevant) for the weather of every
day in April from 1980 to 2008.
In Figure VI we plot the distribution of these placebo average effects against the average effect
measured for the day of the rally, April 15 2009. We present placebos for all the main outcomes
as well as the average standardized effect across all outcomes together (bottom-right graph). The
standardized effect across all outcomes shows that the true average effect has a larger negative
value than any given placebo draw, with only 2.9 percent of the placebos being larger in absolute
magnitude. This is further evidence that our results are statistically meaningful even when drawn
from a distribution with the same spatial correlation patterns.
To summarize, our robustness tests indicate that it is highly unlikely that the results were driven
by random weather patterns that did not have a true causal effect on the Tea Party protests, the
movement, and consequent local political dynamics.
VII Discussion and Conclusion
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This paper provides novel evidence on the effects of political protests on policymaking and elec-
tions. The existing political-economy framework that analyzes how protest size affects voting be-
havior and policy was first developed by Lohmann (1993, 1994a), as discussed in the introduction.
We assess here whether this framework can sufficiently explain our main results. In Lohmann’s
framework, protests affect policy through a Bayesian learning process. We present a simplified
version of the model here. Specifically, when the distribution of policy preferences in society is
unobservable when protesting is costly, the number of protesters expressing their beliefs in favor
of a policy change is a sufficient statistic describing the distribution of beliefs. When they observe
a surprisingly large number of protesters, policymakers update their beliefs about preferences and
the policy they choose to set.35
VII.A. A Simple Information Revelation Model
Suppose that there is a continuum of voters in a congressional district, where the population mea-
sure is normalized to one. Let gc,t be the policy position set by the incumbent in district c at time
t. We can think of gc,t as corresponding to the left-right political spectrum on the real line, where a
higher gc,t corresponds to more conservative roll-call voting. Each voter i has single-peaked pref-
erences in g and therefore a strictly preferred (bliss) policy. The distribution of voters’ preferred
policy in a district is gi,c f (g¯c, σ), where f the is normal probability density function. Since the
distribution is symmetric, g¯c is also the preferred policy of the median voter. There is uncertainty
about the median voter so that gc = g¯c + ec, where ec is drawn from a normal distribution with
mean zero and standard deviation σe and only g¯c is observable.
Incumbents set policy in order to maximize the likelihood of getting reelected. Suppose that it is
always optimal for the incumbent to set policy gc,t equal to the median voter’s preferred policy.
Since the distribution of voters’ preferences is not directly observable, the incumbent in district c
35We assume heterogeneous preferences among voters. Lohmann (1994a) uses heterogeneous beliefs with common
preferences. For our purposes, the distinction is not important.
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will set policy at time t based on his expectation of the median voter:
gc,t = Et[gc|Ic,t]. (7)
Initially, the policy is gc,0. Suppose that at time t = 1, before policy is set, voters can protest for a
more conservative policy gp, where gp > gc,0. A leader coordinates the protests and exogenously
sets the protesters’ policy gp. Only voters with sufficiently conservative preferences will prefer
this proposed policy. Protesting is associated with some cost, qc, because it is unpleasant to stand
outdoors in bad weather, or because there is an opportunity cost. We focus on how weather affects
cost. Protesting in the rain is unpleasant, and so the cost of protesting is higher on a rainy day,
qr, than on a sunny day, qs, making qr > qs. For simplicity’s sake, we assume that the cost is
homogeneous among voters in a given district and that the weather is observable to voters and
policymakers alike.
We assume that people protest sincerely, because they like to express their political preferences,
and that the payoff from protesting, h(gi,c), is strictly increasing in the benefit of the proposed
policy, h′ > 0.36 There is, therefore, a cutoff value above which voters will protest and below
which they will not:
h(gi, c) > qc. (8)
It follows that the number of protesters in a district, pc = Prob(h(gi, c) > qc), depends on
36Even in a more sophisticated game with strategic protesting and collective action problems, such as in Lohmann
(1994a), only those with sufficiently conservative preferences protest.
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the weather, pc(qc). As in Lohmann, pc is a sufficient statistic for identifying the median voter.
Incumbents will then, in periods t > 0, update their beliefs and set policy conditional on the
number of protesters in t = 1.
Now suppose there are N of these congressional districts. Define βt as the mean difference be-
tween policy set in rainy and sunny districts. This difference will reflect the difference between
incumbents’ expectations of the median voter’s bliss policy in the two types of districts:
βt = E[gc,t(rain)− gc,t(sun)]= E[gc|rain]− E[gc|sun] (9)
Our question is what this framework predicts for the reduced-form effect of weather on policy, βt.
If weather and pc are both perfectly observable to policymakers, it is obvious that policy should not
differ across districts (βt = 0). Policymakers will simply adjust the number of protesters for the
weather effect. This simple case suggests that information revelation with no changes in political
preferences among voters is unlikely to drive our results.37 Suppose, instead, that the quality of
information through which protest size reflects underlying preferences depends on the weather.
Weather could then affect incumbents’ beliefs about voter preferences. A straightforward example
is a situation in which policymakers get their information from newspapers, and newspapers only
view large protests as newsworthy. To formalize this, suppose that incumbents only observe pc
when it is sunny. This implies that in sunny districts the median voter is revealed at t = 1, whereas
in rainy districts uncertainty persists past t=1. The key implication is that in any time period
t > 0, as long as additional information about voters’ preferences continues to arrive, the absolute
difference in policy between the two types of districts should decrease.38
37This statement is of course also directly supported by the survey evidence showing that political beliefs shifted in
the conservative direction.
38Note that within a given district the difference in supported policy between two candidates will, in this simple model,
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We thus claim the following: if weather on the protest day has no effect on preferences and only
affects policy through learning, then any initial learning effect should decrease over time as addi-
tional information makes its way to the rainy districts:
|βt| > |βt+1| (10)
We do not, however, find evidence that the effects decrease over time. The results in Table VIII
show that the effects in 2010 are, if anything, larger than the effects in 2009. It is thus unlikely that
protest size only affects policymaking through the learning mechanism proposed by the standard
framework. Instead, this suggests that preferences in the voting population actually shifted, so
that the median voter position became more conservative in sunny districts as compared to rainy
districts.39 The next section highlights some alternative mechanisms that would be consistent with
such a shift.
VII.B. Alternative Mechanisms
If learning does not fully explain our results, a natural question is what does. One strand of literature
that would be consistent with political beliefs actually shifting is the social interactions literature
(e.g. Glaeser et al. 1996, 2003; Topa 2001; Calvo and Jackson 2004). Protesters may be affected
by interactions with other protesters at the Tea Party rally, and non-protesters may be affected by
interactions with protesters. For example, moderate independents could become persuaded by the
Tea Party policy agenda at the protests. Convinced conservatives may feel energized when many
people show, even if only because of nice weather, and become more passionate proselytizers, as
seems to be the case for many of the local Tea Party activists portrayed by Skocpol and Williamson
not increase, as both will adjust their position in the same direction.
39Note that when turnout is less than full, the median voter can shift to the right because of increased turnout among
more conservative citizens.
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(2011). This may be highly effective, as interactions in person are the most effective campaign
instruments available, at least when it comes to raising voter turnout (Green and Gerber 2008).
Furthermore, if political beliefs spread in social networks, protesters may persuade non-protesters.
This would explain why a shift occurred in the voting population towards the conservative position,
and why that shift went beyond those voters initially involved in the Tax Day rallies.40
Another potential mechanism is that protests build a stronger political organization with the re-
sources to support candidates in elections. The lobbying literature predicts that if a group of voters
in society is politically organized, policy is more likely to be set according to this group’s policy
preferences (Baron 1994; Grossman and Helpman 1996; Persson and Tabellini 2000). The crucial
mechanism here is that candidates interested in maximizing the probability of winning an election
will find it optimal to cater to the organized group, since otherwise the group will provide support to
other candidates. This mechanism goes a long way in explaining our findings regarding incumbent
behavior.
Finally, the estimated persistence in political activism is consistent with habit formation models
(Murphy and Shleifer 2004; Mullainathan and Washington 2009; Gerber et al. 2010). According
to this literature, the act of protesting itself makes people more committed to the proposed policy
agenda, and political attitudes shift as a result of having protested. This would explain why we see
that attendance at future protests increases when many people protested initially. This would not,
however, explain why we estimate increases in number of Republican votes that are larger than the
total number of protesters.
Combinations of all three of these alternative mechanisms could of course relevant. Since the
data do not allow us to fully separate between these potential alternative mechanisms, it would be
40This argument parallels the findings of Banerjee et al. (2012). Studying the diffusion of a microfinance intervention,
they show that one-third of the impact detected on the diffusion of the program comes from people who themselves were
not active in taking up the program.
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helpful if further research pinpointed the precise mechanisms through which protests affect voting
behavior and policymaking, and under which conditions.
VII.C. Conclusion
We show that larger political protests can both strengthen the movement they support, and help
advance the political and policy agenda of the movement. We find that the 2009 Tax Day Tea
Party protests increased turnout in favor of the Republican Party in the subsequent congressional
elections, and increased the likelihood that incumbent Democratic representatives decided to re-
tire. Incumbent policymaking was also affected, as representatives responded to large protests in
their district by voting more conservatively in Congress. In addition, we provide evidence that
these effects were driven by a persistent increase in the movement’s strength. Protests led to more
grassroots organizing, to larger subsequent protests and monetary contributions, and to stronger
conservative beliefs, as documented qualitatively by Skocpol and Williamson (2011). Finally, the
estimates imply significant spillover effects: a 0.1 percentage-point increase in the share of the
population protesting corresponds to 1.9 percentage-point increase in the Republican vote share.
Our results suggest that political activism does not derive its usefulness solely from the provision
of information or its consumption value, but that the interactions produced at rallies and protests
can affect citizens’ social contexts in ways such that a movement for political change persists
autonomously. This confirms the importance of social dynamics in networks of citizens for the
realization of political change, and seems of relevance not only in the context of representative
democracies, but also at the onset of revolutionary movements.
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Table I. Summary Statistics by County and Rainfall
Rain No Rain Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Weather April 15, 2009
Precipitation (hundredths of inches) 0.386 0.008 0.379***
(0.021) (0.002) (0.021)
Probability of Rain 0.248 0.199 0.049***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.018)
Election 2008
Republican House Vote (percent of votes) 50.368 51.829 -1.461
(2.993) (2.916) (3.965)
Republican House Votes (percent of population) 21.996 22.406 -0.410
(1.479) (1.144) (1.704)
Votes for Obama (percent of votes) 42.766 40.848 1.917
(1.460) (1.684) (1.996)
Democratic House Votes (percent of population) 20.189 19.713 0.477
(1.218) (1.613) (1.889)
Total House Votes (percent of population) 42.970 43.180 -0.210
(1.135) (1.282) (1.508)
Election 2006
Republican House Vote (percent of votes) 51.953 51.697 0.255
(2.207) (2.047) (2.916)
Republican House Votes (percent of population) 16.226 16.146 0.081
(1.237) (0.823) (1.302)
Democratic House Votes (percent of population) 13.716 14.778 -1.062
(0.716) (1.271) (1.343)
Total Votes (percent of population) 30.519 31.595 -1.075
(1.461) (1.643) (1.865)
Tea Party Movement
Tea Party Express Donations pre-Tax Day 2009 (’000) 0.026 0.018 0.007
(0.011) (0.006) (0.012)
Demographic Controls 2009
Median Household Income 43,477 42,544 933.064
(1,648) (811) (1,686)
Unemployment Rate (percent) 9.819 8.820 1.000*
(0.512) (0.467) (0.571)
Population 114,816 94,164 19,652
(21,885) (17,646) (26,501)
Rural Population (percent) 57.061 60.286 -3.225
(3.325) (1.797) (3.571)
White Population (percent) 85.750 87.347 -1.597
(2.789) (1.867) (2.927)
African-American Population (percent) 10.699 8.105 2.594
(2.713) (1.904) (2.828)
Immigrant Population (percent) 3.899 4.367 -0.468
(0.709) (0.698) (0.933)
Hispanic Population (percent) 4.873 9.495 -4.623
(0.898) (2.873) (2.937)
Number of observations 588 2,170
Note: The unit of analysis is a county. It is defined as rainy if there was significant rain in the county (at least 0.1
inches) on the rally day (April 15, 2009). The variables and the data sources are described in Section III (Data and
Summary Statistics), Section IV.A (Specifications and Hypotheses), and in the Appendix. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered at the state level. The column Di f f erence reports *** 1% , ** 5% , * 10% significance.
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Table II. Exogeneity Check at the County Level
Republican Votes, Democratic Votes, Turnout, Obama Vote
U.S. House, 2008 U.S. House, 2008 U.S. House, 2008 Share, 2008
Votes, % Votes, % Votes, % Votes, % Obama Vote
Dependent Variable of population of votes of population of population Share, 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Rainy Protest 0.53 0.46 0.61 0.99 0.66 0.23 0.93 0.47 1.25 0.58
(0.50) (0.52) (1.25) (1.32) (0.63) (0.62) (0.63) (0.62) (1.39) (1.00)
Observations 2,758 2,758 2,758 2,758 2,758 2,758 2,758 2,758 2,758 2,758
R-squared 0.77 0.79 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.73 0.78 0.66 0.81
Election Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Dep. Var. Mean 17.56 17.56 43.69 43.69 21.37 21.37 40.05 40.05 52.27 52.27
Note: The unit of analysis is a county. Rainy Protest is based on the precipitation amount in the county on the rally day (April 15, 2009). The
dummy variable is equal to one if there was significant rain in the county (at least 0.1 inches) and zero otherwise. All regressions include flexible
controls for the probability of rain, population, and region fixed effects. The 2006 election controls account for the outcomes of the U.S. House of
Representatives elections in 2006 and include the Republican Party vote share, the number of votes for the Republican Party per capita, the number of
votes for the Democratic Party per capita, and turnout per capita. The demographic controls include log of population density, log of median income,
the unemployment rate, the change in unemployment between 2005-2009, the share of white population, the share of African-American population, the
share of Hispanic population, the share of immigrant population, and the share of the population that is rural. More information on the variables, the
data sources, and our specification are described in Section III (Data and Summary Statistics), Section IV.A (Specifications and Hypotheses), and in the
Appendix. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. *** 1% , ** 5% , * 10% significance.
48
Ta
bl
e
II
I.
T
he
E
ff
ec
to
fR
ai
n
on
th
e
N
um
be
ro
fT
ea
Pa
rt
y
Pr
ot
es
te
rs
in
20
09
D
ep
en
de
nt
V
ar
ia
bl
e
Pr
ot
es
te
rs
,%
of
po
pu
la
tio
n
Pr
ot
es
te
rs
,’
00
0
lo
g(
Pr
ot
es
te
rs
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
R
ai
ny
Pr
ot
es
t
-0
.0
82
**
*
-0
.1
70
**
*
-0
.1
28
**
*
-0
.1
08
**
*
-0
.0
96
**
*
-0
.1
90
**
*
-0
.1
65
**
*
-0
.2
28
**
-0
.4
73
**
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
55
)
(0
.0
96
)
(0
.2
11
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
2,
75
8
2,
75
8
2,
75
8
54
2
2,
75
8
2,
75
8
2,
75
8
54
2
47
8
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
16
0.
14
0.
15
0.
22
0.
41
0.
41
0.
41
0.
40
0.
43
Pr
ot
es
te
rs
V
ar
ia
bl
e
M
ea
n
M
ax
M
ea
n
M
ea
n
M
ea
n
M
ax
M
ea
n
M
ea
n
M
ea
n
R
ai
n
V
ar
ia
bl
e
D
um
m
y
D
um
m
y
C
on
tin
uo
us
D
um
m
y
D
um
m
y
D
um
m
y
C
on
tin
uo
us
D
um
m
y
D
um
m
y
Sa
m
pl
e
C
ou
nt
ie
s
A
ll
A
ll
A
ll
Pr
ot
es
te
rs
>
0
A
ll
A
ll
A
ll
Pr
ot
es
te
rs
>
0
Pr
ot
es
te
rs
>
0
E
le
ct
io
n
C
on
tr
ol
s
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
C
on
tr
ol
s
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
D
ep
.V
ar
.M
ea
n
0.
16
1
0.
29
5
0.
16
1
0.
24
0
0.
16
0
0.
29
3
0.
16
0
0.
81
5
6.
59
8
N
ot
e:
T
he
un
it
of
an
al
ys
is
is
a
co
un
ty
.
R
ai
ny
P
ro
te
st
is
ba
se
d
on
th
e
pr
ec
ip
ita
tio
n
am
ou
nt
in
th
e
co
un
ty
on
th
e
ra
lly
da
y
(A
pr
il
15
,2
00
9)
.
T
he
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
is
eq
ua
lt
o
on
e
if
th
er
e
w
as
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ra
in
in
th
e
co
un
ty
(a
tl
ea
st
0.
1
in
ch
es
)
an
d
ze
ro
ot
he
rw
is
e.
T
he
co
nt
in
uo
us
va
ri
ab
le
in
co
lu
m
ns
3
an
d
7
is
th
e
pr
ec
ip
ita
tio
n
am
ou
nt
in
in
ch
es
.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
fle
xi
bl
e
co
nt
ro
ls
fo
r
th
e
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
of
ra
in
,
po
pu
la
tio
n,
an
d
re
gi
on
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s.
T
he
el
ec
tio
n
co
nt
ro
ls
ac
co
un
tf
or
th
e
ou
tc
om
es
of
th
e
U
.S
.H
ou
se
of
R
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
el
ec
tio
ns
in
20
08
.I
n
th
e
pe
r-
ca
pi
ta
re
gr
es
si
on
s
w
e
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
R
ep
ub
lic
an
Pa
rt
y
vo
te
sh
ar
e,
th
e
nu
m
be
ro
fv
ot
es
fo
rt
he
R
ep
ub
lic
an
Pa
rt
y
pe
rc
ap
ita
,t
he
nu
m
be
ro
fv
ot
es
fo
rt
he
D
em
oc
ra
tic
Pa
rt
y
pe
rc
ap
ita
,a
nd
tu
rn
ou
tp
er
ca
pi
ta
.T
he
le
ve
lr
eg
re
ss
io
ns
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
R
ep
ub
lic
an
Pa
rt
y
vo
te
sh
ar
e,
th
e
to
ta
ln
um
be
r
of
vo
te
s
fo
r
th
e
R
ep
ub
lic
an
Pa
rt
y,
th
e
to
ta
ln
um
be
r
of
vo
te
s
fo
r
th
e
D
em
oc
ra
tic
Pa
rt
y,
an
d
to
ta
lt
ur
no
ut
.
C
ol
um
n
9
ta
ke
s
th
e
na
tu
ra
ll
og
ar
ith
m
of
th
e
el
ec
tio
n
co
nt
ro
ls
.
T
he
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
co
nt
ro
ls
in
cl
ud
e
lo
g
of
po
pu
la
tio
n
de
ns
ity
,l
og
of
m
ed
ia
n
in
co
m
e,
th
e
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
tr
at
e,
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
tb
et
w
ee
n
20
05
-2
00
9,
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
w
hi
te
po
pu
la
tio
n,
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
A
fr
ic
an
-A
m
er
ic
an
po
pu
la
tio
n,
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
H
is
pa
ni
c
po
pu
la
tio
n,
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
im
m
ig
ra
nt
po
pu
la
tio
n,
an
d
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
th
e
po
pu
la
tio
n
th
at
is
ru
ra
l.
M
or
e
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
s,
th
e
da
ta
so
ur
ce
s,
an
d
ou
r
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
ar
e
de
sc
ri
be
d
in
Se
ct
io
n
II
I
(D
at
a
an
d
Su
m
m
ar
y
St
at
is
tic
s)
,S
ec
tio
n
IV
.A
(S
pe
ci
fic
at
io
ns
an
d
H
yp
ot
he
se
s)
,a
nd
in
th
e
A
pp
en
di
x.
M
ea
n
de
no
te
s
th
e
av
er
ag
e
tu
rn
ou
ta
cr
os
s
th
e
th
re
e
so
ur
ce
s
of
at
te
nd
an
ce
da
ta
.
M
ax
is
th
e
hi
gh
es
tr
ep
or
te
d
tu
rn
ou
ti
n
an
y
gi
ve
n
lo
ca
tio
n.
R
ob
us
ts
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
st
at
e
le
ve
l.
**
*
1%
,*
*
5%
,*
10
%
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e.
49
Ta
bl
e
IV
.T
he
E
ff
ec
to
fT
ea
Pa
rt
y
Pr
ot
es
ts
on
L
oc
al
Te
a
Pa
rt
y
A
ct
iv
ity
an
d
PA
C
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
D
ep
en
de
nt
V
ar
ia
bl
e
Te
a
Pa
rt
y
O
rg
an
iz
er
s,
20
10
Te
a
Pa
rt
y
Pr
ot
es
te
rs
,2
01
0
PA
C
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
20
09
20
10
20
09
-2
01
0
Se
co
nd
-s
ta
ge
Se
co
nd
-s
ta
ge
Se
co
nd
-s
ta
ge
2S
L
S
es
tim
at
es
2S
L
S
es
tim
at
es
2S
L
S
es
tim
at
es
Pe
rs
on
s,
%
of
po
pu
la
tio
n
PA
C
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
,$
pe
rc
ap
ita
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
R
ai
ny
Pr
ot
es
t
-0
.0
07
7*
*
-0
.0
65
**
-0
.0
00
32
**
-0
.0
01
1*
**
-0
.0
01
4*
**
(0
.0
03
0)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
00
13
)
(0
.0
00
4)
(0
.0
00
5)
%
of
Po
p.
Pr
ot
es
tin
g
Sc
al
in
g
0.
09
31
**
0.
79
4*
**
1.
70
0*
*
(0
.0
38
2)
(0
.2
77
)
(0
.6
98
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
2,
75
8
2,
75
8
2,
75
8
2,
75
8
2,
75
8
2,
75
8
2,
75
8
2,
75
8
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
04
-
0.
05
-
0.
16
0.
20
0.
23
-
Pr
ot
es
te
rs
V
ar
ia
bl
e
-
M
ea
n
-
M
ea
n
-
-
-
M
ea
n
E
le
ct
io
n
C
on
tr
ol
s
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
C
on
tr
ol
s
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
D
ep
.V
ar
.M
ea
n
0.
05
8
0.
05
8
0.
07
0
0.
07
0
0.
00
2
0.
00
8
0.
01
0
0.
01
0
N
ot
e:
T
he
un
it
of
an
al
ys
is
is
a
co
un
ty
.
R
ai
ny
P
ro
te
st
is
ba
se
d
on
th
e
pr
ec
ip
ita
tio
n
am
ou
nt
in
th
e
co
un
ty
on
th
e
ra
lly
da
y
(A
pr
il
15
,2
00
9)
.T
he
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
is
eq
ua
lt
o
on
e
if
th
er
e
w
as
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ra
in
in
th
e
co
un
ty
(a
tl
ea
st
0.
1
in
ch
es
)
an
d
ze
ro
ot
he
rw
is
e.
W
e
in
st
ru
m
en
tf
or
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
pr
ot
es
te
rs
us
in
g
R
ai
ny
P
ro
te
st
an
d
2S
L
S
to
de
riv
e
th
e
sc
al
in
g
es
tim
at
es
in
co
lu
m
ns
2,
4,
an
d
8.
%
of
Po
p.
P
ro
te
st
in
g
Sc
al
in
g
is
ba
se
d
on
th
e
pe
rc
en
to
fp
eo
pl
e
at
te
nd
in
g
on
th
e
ra
lly
da
y
re
la
tiv
e
th
e
co
un
ty
po
pu
la
tio
n.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
fle
xi
bl
e
co
nt
ro
ls
fo
rt
he
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
of
ra
in
,p
op
ul
at
io
n,
an
d
re
gi
on
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s.
T
he
el
ec
tio
n
co
nt
ro
ls
ac
co
un
tf
or
th
e
ou
tc
om
es
of
th
e
U
.S
.H
ou
se
of
R
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
el
ec
tio
ns
in
20
08
an
d
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
R
ep
ub
lic
an
Pa
rt
y
vo
te
sh
ar
e,
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
vo
te
s
fo
r
th
e
R
ep
ub
lic
an
Pa
rt
y
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
,t
he
nu
m
be
r
of
vo
te
s
fo
r
th
e
D
em
oc
ra
tic
Pa
rt
y
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
,a
nd
tu
rn
ou
tp
er
ca
pi
ta
.
T
he
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
co
nt
ro
ls
in
cl
ud
e
lo
g
of
po
pu
la
tio
n
de
ns
ity
,l
og
of
m
ed
ia
n
in
co
m
e,
th
e
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
tr
at
e,
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
tb
et
w
ee
n
20
05
-2
00
9,
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
w
hi
te
po
pu
la
tio
n,
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
A
fr
ic
an
-A
m
er
ic
an
po
pu
la
tio
n,
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
H
is
pa
ni
c
po
pu
la
tio
n,
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
im
m
ig
ra
nt
po
pu
la
tio
n,
an
d
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
th
e
po
pu
la
tio
n
th
at
is
ru
ra
l.
M
or
e
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
s,
th
e
da
ta
so
ur
ce
s,
an
d
ou
r
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
ar
e
de
sc
ri
be
d
in
Se
ct
io
n
II
I
(D
at
a
an
d
Su
m
m
ar
y
St
at
is
tic
s)
,S
ec
tio
n
IV
.A
(S
pe
ci
fic
at
io
ns
an
d
H
yp
ot
he
se
s)
,a
nd
in
th
e
A
pp
en
di
x.
M
ea
n
de
no
te
s
th
e
av
er
ag
e
tu
rn
ou
ta
cr
os
s
th
e
th
re
e
so
ur
ce
s
of
at
te
nd
an
ce
da
ta
.R
ob
us
ts
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
st
at
e
le
ve
l.
**
*
1%
,*
*
5%
,*
10
%
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e.
50
Ta
bl
e
V
.P
ol
iti
ca
lB
el
ie
fs
,A
N
E
S
Su
rv
ey
20
10
St
ro
ng
ly
su
pp
or
ts
Fe
el
s
ou
tr
ag
ed
O
pp
os
es
ra
is
in
g
B
el
ie
ve
s
A
m
er
ic
an
s
U
nf
av
or
ab
le
R
ep
or
te
d
th
e
Te
a
Pa
rt
y
Fa
vo
ra
bl
e
vi
ew
ab
ou
tt
he
w
ay
ta
xe
s
on
to
da
y
ha
ve
le
ss
fe
el
in
gs
to
w
ar
ds
lik
el
ih
oo
d
of
m
ov
em
en
t,
on
Sa
ra
h
Pa
lin
,
th
in
gs
ar
e
go
in
g
in
in
co
m
e>
$
25
0K
,
fr
ee
do
m
co
m
pa
re
d
to
Pr
es
id
en
t
A
ve
ra
ge
be
lie
f
vo
tin
g
in
th
e
20
10
D
ep
en
de
nt
V
ar
ia
bl
e
du
m
m
y
du
m
m
y
co
un
tr
y,
du
m
m
y
du
m
m
y
20
08
,d
um
m
y
O
ba
m
a,
du
m
m
y
ef
fe
ct
m
id
te
rm
el
ec
tio
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
R
ai
ny
Pr
ot
es
t
-0
.0
57
**
-0
.0
57
**
-0
.0
46
**
-0
.0
58
*
-0
.0
65
**
-0
.0
46
*
-0
.1
3*
**
-0
.0
67
**
*
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
24
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
1,
14
6
1,
14
0
1,
14
2
1,
14
0
1,
13
8
1,
14
5
-
1,
09
2
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
17
2
0.
30
0
0.
10
1
0.
22
6
0.
12
0
0.
29
2
-
0.
30
3
E
le
ct
io
n
C
on
tr
ol
s
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
C
on
tr
ol
s
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
D
ep
.V
ar
.M
ea
n
0.
12
0
0.
31
1
0.
17
4
0.
22
8
0.
43
8
0.
24
5
-
0.
70
1
N
ot
e:
T
he
un
it
of
an
al
ys
is
is
a
su
rv
ey
re
sp
on
de
nt
,f
ro
m
th
e
20
10
A
N
E
S
su
rv
ey
da
ta
.
T
he
su
rv
ey
to
ok
pl
ac
e
in
O
ct
ob
er
20
10
.
R
ai
ny
P
ro
te
st
is
ba
se
d
on
th
e
pr
ec
ip
ita
tio
n
am
ou
nt
in
th
e
di
st
ri
ct
on
th
e
ra
lly
da
y
(A
pr
il
15
,2
00
9)
.
T
he
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
is
eq
ua
lt
o
on
e
if
th
er
e
w
as
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ra
in
in
th
e
di
st
ri
ct
(a
tl
ea
st
0.
1
in
ch
es
)
an
d
ze
ro
ot
he
rw
is
e.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
fle
xi
bl
e
co
nt
ro
ls
fo
r
th
e
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
of
ra
in
,p
op
ul
at
io
n,
an
d
re
gi
on
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s.
T
he
el
ec
tio
n
co
nt
ro
ls
ac
co
un
tf
or
w
he
th
er
th
e
re
sp
on
de
nt
vo
te
d
fo
rt
he
R
ep
ub
lic
an
s
in
th
e
U
.S
.H
ou
se
of
R
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
el
ec
tio
ns
in
20
08
.T
he
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
co
nt
ro
ls
in
cl
ud
e
ag
e,
ed
uc
at
io
n,
ra
ce
(w
hi
te
,A
fr
ic
an
A
m
er
ic
an
,H
is
pa
ni
c)
,h
ou
se
ho
ld
in
co
m
e,
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
ts
ta
tu
s
(c
ur
re
nt
ly
w
or
ki
ng
),
liv
in
g
in
a
ru
ra
la
re
a,
an
d
fo
re
ig
n
bo
rn
.M
or
e
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
s,
th
e
da
ta
so
ur
ce
s,
an
d
ou
rs
pe
ci
fic
at
io
n
ar
e
de
sc
ri
be
d
in
Se
ct
io
n
II
I(
D
at
a
an
d
Su
m
m
ar
y
St
at
is
tic
s)
,S
ec
tio
n
IV
.A
(S
pe
ci
fic
at
io
ns
an
d
H
yp
ot
he
se
s)
,a
nd
in
th
e
A
pp
en
di
x.
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
st
at
e
le
ve
l.
**
*
1%
,*
*
5%
,*
10
%
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e.
51
Ta
bl
e
V
I.
T
he
E
ff
ec
to
fT
ea
Pa
rt
y
Pr
ot
es
ts
on
Vo
tin
g
B
eh
av
io
r,
20
10
U
.S
.H
ou
se
D
ep
en
de
nt
V
ar
ia
bl
e
R
ep
ub
lic
an
Pa
rt
y
Vo
te
s
D
em
oc
ra
tic
Pa
rt
y
Vo
te
s
R
ep
ub
lic
an
Vo
te
Sh
ar
e
Se
co
nd
-s
ta
ge
Se
co
nd
-s
ta
ge
Se
co
nd
-s
ta
ge
2S
L
S
es
tim
at
es
2S
L
S
es
tim
at
es
2S
L
S
es
tim
at
es
Vo
te
s,
%
of
co
un
ty
po
pu
la
tio
n
Vo
te
s,
%
of
co
un
ty
vo
te
s
Vo
te
s,
%
of
di
st
ri
ct
vo
te
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
R
ai
ny
Pr
ot
es
t
-1
.0
4*
**
-0
.1
4
-1
.5
5*
*
-1
.9
2*
**
(0
.3
0)
(0
.3
5)
(0
.6
9)
(0
.6
8)
%
of
Po
p.
Pr
ot
es
tin
g
Sc
al
in
g
12
.5
9*
**
1.
73
18
.8
1*
*
(4
.2
1)
(4
.1
4)
(7
.8
5)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
2,
75
8
2,
75
8
2,
75
8
2,
75
8
2,
75
8
2,
75
8
43
5
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
88
-
0.
87
-
0.
89
-
0.
91
Pr
ot
es
te
rs
V
ar
ia
bl
e
-
M
ea
n
-
M
ea
n
-
M
ea
n
-
E
le
ct
io
n
C
on
tr
ol
s
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
C
on
tr
ol
s
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
D
ep
.V
ar
.M
ea
n
14
.9
7
14
.9
7
12
.7
6
12
.7
6
52
.4
7
52
.4
7
50
.8
6
N
ot
e:
T
he
un
it
of
an
al
ys
is
is
a
co
un
ty
ex
ce
pt
fo
r
co
lu
m
n
7
w
he
re
w
e
an
al
yz
e
th
e
co
ng
re
ss
io
na
ld
is
tr
ic
t.
R
ai
ny
P
ro
te
st
is
ba
se
d
on
th
e
pr
ec
ip
ita
tio
n
am
ou
nt
in
th
e
co
un
ty
(o
r
di
st
ri
ct
)
on
th
e
ra
lly
da
y
(A
pr
il
15
,2
00
9)
.T
he
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
is
eq
ua
lt
o
on
e
if
th
er
e
w
as
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ra
in
in
th
e
co
un
ty
(o
rd
is
tr
ic
t)
(a
tl
ea
st
0.
1
in
ch
es
)a
nd
ze
ro
ot
he
rw
is
e.
W
e
in
st
ru
m
en
tf
or
th
e
nu
m
be
ro
f
pr
ot
es
te
rs
us
in
g
R
ai
ny
P
ro
te
st
an
d
2S
L
S
to
de
riv
e
th
e
sc
al
in
g
es
tim
at
es
in
co
lu
m
ns
2,
4,
an
d
6.
%
of
Po
p.
P
ro
te
st
in
g
Sc
al
in
g
is
ba
se
d
on
th
e
pe
rc
en
to
fp
eo
pl
e
at
te
nd
in
g
on
th
e
ra
lly
da
y
re
la
tiv
e
th
e
co
un
ty
po
pu
la
tio
n.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
fle
xi
bl
e
co
nt
ro
ls
fo
rt
he
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
of
ra
in
,p
op
ul
at
io
n,
an
d
re
gi
on
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s.
T
he
el
ec
tio
n
co
nt
ro
ls
ac
co
un
tf
or
th
e
ou
tc
om
es
of
th
e
U
.S
.H
ou
se
of
R
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
el
ec
tio
ns
in
20
08
an
d
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
R
ep
ub
lic
an
Pa
rt
y
vo
te
sh
ar
e,
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
vo
te
s
fo
r
th
e
R
ep
ub
lic
an
Pa
rt
y
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
,t
he
nu
m
be
r
of
vo
te
s
fo
r
th
e
D
em
oc
ra
tic
Pa
rt
y
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
,a
nd
tu
rn
ou
tp
er
ca
pi
ta
.I
n
ad
di
tio
n,
th
e
co
ng
re
ss
io
na
l-
di
st
ri
ct
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
in
co
lu
m
n
9
al
so
in
cl
ud
es
pr
io
rr
ol
lc
al
lc
on
tr
ol
s
to
ac
co
un
tfl
ex
ib
ly
fo
rt
he
pa
st
tw
o
ye
ar
s
of
A
C
U
sc
or
es
an
d
el
ec
tio
n
co
nt
ro
ls
of
th
e
id
en
tit
y
of
th
e
vi
ct
or
io
us
pa
rt
y
of
th
e
pa
st
tw
o
el
ec
tio
ns
.T
he
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
co
nt
ro
ls
in
cl
ud
e
lo
g
of
po
pu
la
tio
n
de
ns
ity
,l
og
of
m
ed
ia
n
in
co
m
e,
th
e
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
tr
at
e,
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
tb
et
w
ee
n
20
05
-2
00
9,
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
w
hi
te
po
pu
la
tio
n,
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
A
fr
ic
an
-A
m
er
ic
an
po
pu
la
tio
n,
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
H
is
pa
ni
c
po
pu
la
tio
n,
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
im
m
ig
ra
nt
po
pu
la
tio
n,
an
d
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
th
e
po
pu
la
tio
n
th
at
is
ru
ra
l.
M
or
e
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
s,
th
e
da
ta
so
ur
ce
s,
an
d
ou
rs
pe
ci
fic
at
io
n
ar
e
de
sc
ri
be
d
in
Se
ct
io
n
II
I(
D
at
a
an
d
Su
m
m
ar
y
St
at
is
tic
s)
,S
ec
tio
n
IV
.A
(S
pe
ci
fic
at
io
ns
an
d
H
yp
ot
he
se
s)
,a
nd
in
th
e
A
pp
en
di
x.
M
ea
n
de
no
te
s
th
e
av
er
ag
e
tu
rn
ou
ta
cr
os
s
th
e
th
re
e
so
ur
ce
s
of
at
te
nd
an
ce
da
ta
.
R
ob
us
ts
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
st
at
e
le
ve
l.
**
*
1%
,*
*
5%
,*
10
%
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e.
52
Ta
bl
e
V
II
.P
ol
ic
y-
M
ak
in
g
Im
pa
ct
A
C
U
Sc
or
e
R
et
ir
em
en
t
D
ep
en
de
nt
V
ar
ia
bl
e
20
09
20
10
∆
Sc
or
e
20
10
-2
00
8
Fu
ll
A
ll
Vo
te
s
Fu
ll
A
ll
Vo
te
s
Fu
ll
A
ll
Vo
te
s
R
ep
ub
lic
an
s
D
em
oc
ra
ts
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
R
ai
ny
Pr
ot
es
t
-1
.9
22
**
-2
.8
27
**
*
-4
.2
96
**
*
-3
.1
81
**
-3
.3
71
**
-2
.4
05
0.
04
9
-0
.0
94
**
*
(0
.9
37
)
(1
.0
21
)
(1
.2
58
)
(1
.4
11
)
(1
.3
10
)
(1
.8
49
)
(0
.0
64
)
(0
.0
34
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
43
5
32
7
43
5
27
9
43
5
19
1
17
9
25
6
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
97
9
0.
98
2
0.
96
1
0.
97
3
0.
80
4
0.
89
4
0.
24
2
0.
23
5
E
le
ct
io
n
C
on
tr
ol
s
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
C
on
tr
ol
s
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
D
ep
.V
ar
.M
ea
n
41
.1
4
41
.4
4
41
.4
5
39
.1
7
-0
.1
64
-0
.1
57
0.
04
47
0.
04
69
N
ot
e:
T
he
un
it
of
an
al
ys
is
is
a
co
ng
re
ss
io
na
ld
is
tr
ic
t.
R
ai
ny
P
ro
te
st
is
ba
se
d
on
th
e
pr
ec
ip
ita
tio
n
am
ou
nt
in
th
e
di
st
ri
ct
on
th
e
ra
lly
da
y
(A
pr
il
15
,2
00
9)
.
T
he
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
is
eq
ua
lt
o
on
e
if
th
er
e
w
as
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ra
in
in
th
e
di
st
ri
ct
(a
tl
ea
st
0.
1
in
ch
es
)
an
d
ze
ro
ot
he
rw
is
e.
Fu
ll
de
no
te
s
us
in
g
th
e
fu
ll
sa
m
pl
e
of
al
lc
on
gr
es
sm
en
.
A
ll
vo
te
s
in
cl
ud
es
on
ly
th
e
co
ng
re
ss
m
en
th
at
vo
te
d
on
al
ls
co
re
d
vo
te
s.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
fle
xi
bl
e
co
nt
ro
ls
fo
rt
he
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
of
ra
in
,p
op
ul
at
io
n,
an
d
re
gi
on
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s.
T
he
pr
io
rr
ol
lc
al
lc
on
tr
ol
s
ac
co
un
t
fle
xi
bl
y
fo
r
th
e
pa
st
tw
o
ye
ar
s
of
A
C
U
sc
or
es
.
T
he
el
ec
tio
n
co
nt
ro
ls
ac
co
un
t
fo
r
ou
tc
om
es
in
th
e
la
st
tw
o
el
ec
tio
ns
to
th
e
U
.S
.H
ou
se
of
R
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
an
d
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
id
en
tit
y
of
th
e
vi
ct
or
io
us
pa
rt
y,
th
e
R
ep
ub
lic
an
Pa
rt
y
vo
te
sh
ar
e,
th
e
to
ta
ln
um
be
r
of
vo
te
s
fo
r
th
e
R
ep
ub
lic
an
Pa
rt
y,
th
e
to
ta
ln
um
be
r
of
vo
te
s
fo
r
th
e
D
em
oc
ra
tic
Pa
rt
y,
an
d
to
ta
lt
ur
no
ut
.
T
he
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
co
nt
ro
ls
in
cl
ud
e
lo
g
of
po
pu
la
tio
n
de
ns
ity
,l
og
of
m
ed
ia
n
in
co
m
e,
th
e
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
tr
at
e,
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
tb
et
w
ee
n
20
05
-2
00
9,
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
w
hi
te
po
pu
la
tio
n,
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
A
fr
ic
an
-A
m
er
ic
an
po
pu
la
tio
n,
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
H
is
pa
ni
c
po
pu
la
tio
n,
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
im
m
ig
ra
nt
po
pu
la
tio
n,
an
d
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
th
e
po
pu
la
tio
n
th
at
is
ru
ra
l.
M
or
e
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
s,
th
e
da
ta
so
ur
ce
s,
an
d
ou
r
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
ar
e
de
sc
ri
be
d
in
Se
ct
io
n
II
I
(D
at
a
an
d
Su
m
m
ar
y
St
at
is
tic
s)
,S
ec
tio
n
IV
.A
(S
pe
ci
fic
at
io
ns
an
d
H
yp
ot
he
se
s)
,a
nd
in
th
e
A
pp
en
di
x.
R
ob
us
ts
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
st
at
e
le
ve
l.
**
*
1%
,*
*
5%
,*
10
%
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e.
53
Fi
gu
re
I.
Te
a
Pa
rt
y
R
al
lie
s
on
A
pr
il
15
,2
00
9.
To
ta
ln
um
be
ro
fc
ou
nt
ie
s
w
ith
ra
lli
es
is
54
2,
w
ith
a
m
ea
n
at
te
nd
an
ce
of
81
5
an
d
a
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
of
1,
50
6.
T
he
si
ze
of
th
e
ci
rc
le
s
re
fle
ct
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
th
e
po
pu
la
tio
n
tu
rn
in
g
ou
tt
o
pr
ot
es
t.
54
Fi
gu
re
II
.W
eb
Se
ar
ch
L
ev
el
of
In
te
re
st
.
T
hi
s
gr
ap
h
sh
ow
s
th
e
ev
ol
ut
io
n
of
th
e
nu
m
be
ro
fG
oo
gl
e
w
eb
se
ar
ch
es
fo
r“
Te
a
Pa
rt
y,
”
ex
cl
ud
in
g
“B
os
to
n
Te
a
Pa
rt
y”
se
ar
ch
es
,
no
rm
al
iz
ed
by
to
ta
lw
eb
se
ar
ch
vo
lu
m
e
an
d
in
de
xe
d
to
a
pe
ak
se
ar
ch
le
ve
lo
f1
00
.
55
Fi
gu
re
II
I.
R
ai
nf
al
lr
es
id
ua
ls
on
A
pr
il
15
,2
00
9.
T
he
m
ap
sh
ow
s
th
e
ge
og
ra
ph
ic
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n
of
th
e
ra
in
re
si
du
al
s
in
eq
ua
tio
n
1.
B
la
ck
do
ts
in
di
ca
te
po
si
tiv
e
ra
in
sh
oc
ks
,a
nd
w
hi
te
do
ts
in
di
ca
te
ne
ga
tiv
e
sh
oc
ks
.
56
Fi
gu
re
IV
.N
ew
sp
ap
er
C
ov
er
ag
e
D
iff
er
en
tia
lb
y
R
ai
n
on
4/
15
/2
00
9.
T
hi
s
gr
ap
h
sh
ow
s
th
e
ev
ol
ut
io
n
of
lo
ca
lm
ed
ia
co
ve
ra
ge
of
th
e
Te
a
Pa
rt
y,
as
a
fu
nc
tio
n
of
ra
in
fa
ll
on
th
e
da
y
of
th
e
Te
a
Pa
rt
y
ra
lli
es
(A
pr
il
15
,2
00
9)
.T
he
bl
ue
lin
e
re
pr
es
en
ts
th
e
po
in
te
st
im
at
es
,w
ith
gr
ay
lin
es
co
rr
es
po
nd
in
g
to
th
e
95
pe
rc
en
t
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s.
57
Fi
gu
re
V
.T
he
gr
ap
hs
sh
ow
th
e
m
ai
n
ef
fe
ct
of
ra
in
fa
ll
on
th
e
da
y
of
th
e
Te
a
Pa
rt
y
ra
lli
es
(A
pr
il
15
,
20
09
),
co
m
pa
re
d
to
th
e
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n
of
es
tim
at
es
fo
r
ra
in
fa
ll
fr
om
th
e
pl
ac
eb
o
da
te
s
fo
r
a
se
le
ct
ed
se
t
of
ou
r
ou
tc
om
es
.
T
he
A
pp
en
di
x
co
nt
ai
ns
th
e
gr
ap
hs
fo
r
th
e
re
m
ai
ni
ng
re
su
lts
.
T
he
pl
ac
eb
o
da
te
s
co
ns
is
to
f
ea
ch
da
y
in
A
pr
il
be
tw
ee
n
19
80
an
d
20
08
w
he
re
at
le
as
tt
en
pe
rc
en
to
f
th
e
co
un
tie
s
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
ra
in
.
T
he
bl
ac
k
lin
e
in
di
ca
te
s
th
e
es
tim
at
ed
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
on
th
e
da
y
of
th
e
ra
lli
es
.
U
nd
er
ea
ch
gr
ap
h
tw
o
su
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
tic
s
ar
e
pr
es
en
te
d,
w
he
re
p 1
is
th
e
fr
ac
tio
n
of
pl
ac
eb
o
es
tim
at
es
w
ith
m
or
e
ne
ga
tiv
e
va
lu
es
co
m
pa
re
d
to
th
e
es
tim
at
e
on
th
e
da
y
of
th
e
ra
lly
,a
nd
p 2
is
th
e
fr
ac
tio
n
w
ith
la
rg
er
ab
so
lu
te
va
lu
es
.
58
Fi
gu
re
V
I.
T
he
gr
ap
hs
sh
ow
th
e
av
er
ag
e
st
an
da
rd
iz
ed
ef
fe
ct
of
ra
in
fa
ll
on
th
e
da
y
of
th
e
Te
a
Pa
rt
y
ra
lli
es
(A
pr
il
15
,
20
09
),
co
m
pa
re
d
to
th
e
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n
of
es
tim
at
es
fr
om
th
e
pl
ac
eb
o
da
te
s.
T
he
pl
ac
eb
o
da
te
s
co
ns
is
to
f
ea
ch
da
y
in
A
pr
il
be
tw
ee
n
19
80
an
d
20
08
w
he
re
at
le
as
t
te
n
pe
rc
en
t
of
th
e
co
un
tie
s
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
ra
in
.
T
he
bl
ac
k
lin
e
in
di
ca
te
s
th
e
es
tim
at
ed
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
on
th
e
da
y
of
th
e
ra
lli
es
.
T
he
ou
tc
om
es
ar
e:
Te
a
Pa
rt
y
M
ov
em
en
t
(O
rg
an
iz
er
s
20
10
,
Pr
ot
es
te
rs
20
10
,
an
d
PA
C
co
nt
ri
bu
tio
ns
,b
ot
h
th
e
le
ve
la
nd
pe
r-
ca
pi
ta
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns
of
Ta
bl
es
4
an
d
5)
;P
ol
iti
ca
lB
el
ie
fs
(s
am
e
as
co
lu
m
ns
1-
6,
of
Ta
bl
e
6)
;V
ot
in
g
B
eh
av
io
ri
n
th
e
20
10
E
le
ct
io
n
(R
ep
ub
lic
an
Pa
rt
y
vo
te
s
an
d
vo
te
sh
ar
e,
sa
m
e
as
co
lu
m
ns
1,
2
an
d
13
of
Ta
bl
e
7)
,a
nd
;
Po
lic
y-
M
ak
in
g
(A
C
U
Sc
or
e
20
09
,A
C
U
Sc
or
e
20
10
,a
nd
R
et
ir
em
en
to
fD
em
oc
ra
ts
,s
am
e
as
co
lu
m
ns
1-
4
an
d
8
of
Ta
bl
e
8)
.T
he
bo
tto
m
-r
ig
ht
gr
ap
h
is
th
e
av
er
ag
e
st
an
da
rd
iz
ed
ef
fe
ct
ac
ro
ss
al
lt
ho
se
ou
tc
om
es
.
U
nd
er
ea
ch
gr
ap
h
tw
o
su
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
tic
s
ar
e
pr
es
en
te
d,
w
he
re
p 1
is
th
e
fr
ac
tio
n
of
pl
ac
eb
o
es
tim
at
es
w
ith
m
or
e
ne
ga
tiv
e
va
lu
es
co
m
pa
re
d
to
th
e
es
tim
at
e
on
th
e
da
y
of
th
e
ra
lly
,a
nd
p 2
is
th
e
fr
ac
tio
n
w
ith
la
rg
er
ab
so
lu
te
va
lu
es
.
59
